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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court err in determining on summary judgment that a
joint venture was created between Appellant 51-SPR-L.L.C. ("51-SPR") and Guy Hatch
and Broadstone Investments, LC, in developing the Northshore Office Buildings when
51-SPR acted as a mere investor, without any duty to share in losses?
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3.1, -4 (2002); Bassett v. Baker,
530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974); Betenson v. Call Auto & Equip. Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (Utah
1982).
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Waddoups v.
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, ^f 21, 54 P.3d 1054. This issue was preserved in
51-SPR's memoranda [R.966-68, 2348-54] and at oral argument [Tr. 8463 at 17-34]. 1
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err in determining on summary judgment that the
mechanics' liens of Appellee Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("EPCO")
against 51-SPR's buildings were timely when disputed facts existed as to (i) the dates on

Citations to the record within this brief are as follows: (1) references to record
pages are preceded by "R."; (2) portions of the ten transcript volumes are referred to as
"Tr." followed by the record number (e.g., 8459) and the page; and (3) trial exhibits are
cited as "PI. Ex." or "Def. Ex." All relevant orders are attached as Addenda, which are
cited with an "Add." reference.
1

which work on the buildings was completed, and (ii) when the owner accepted EPCO's
work as complete?
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§38-1-3, -7(1 )(b) (2001); Interiors
Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, (Utah Ct. App.
1994); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d 963
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Waddoups,
2002 UT 69 at ^| 21. This issue was preserved in 51-SPR's memoranda [R.961-63,
3220-23, 4383-88, 5951-55, 6155-59] and at oral argument. [Tr. 8464 at 78-90].
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err in refusing to apply the binding, enforceable
lien waivers that EPCO executed during the construction of the buildings? Subsumed in
this issue are three discrete subissues: whether, based on the lien waivers, the trial court
erred in (a) failing to reduce the value of EPCO's mechanics' lien claim; (b) refusing to
require EPCO to indemnify 51-SPR against subcontract claims; and (c) refusing to find a
breach of EPCO's warranty and guaranty that it had paid subcontractors.
Determinative Law: Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell,
824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Standard of Review: This issue presents pure questions of law, which the Court
reviews for correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d
880, 885 (Utah 1993). This issue was preserved in 51-SPR's memoranda [R.3217-18,

2

3223-26, 4707-22, 7746-51], at oral argument [Tr. 8459 at 117-19; 8464 at 7-16, 4 9 57; 8470 at 20-23; 8471 at 44-46], and at trial [R.7779-84; Tr. 8468 at 652-63],
Issue No. 4: Did the trial court err in concluding that EPCO did not violate the
abusive lien statute when it filed a lien on 51-SPR's property for $78,000 it allegedly paid
to Hatch's company for work performed on the Williams Property, which provided no
benefit whatsoever to 51-SPR's Northshore property?
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-3, -25 (2001).
Standard of Review: This issue presents questions of law and fact. The Court
reviews factual determinations for clear error, Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282,
1286 (Utah 1993), and questions of law for correctness. United Park City Mines Co., 870
P.2d at 885. This issue was preserved in 51-SPR's memoranda [R.3219-20, 3321-22,
4593, 4706-07], at oral argument [Tr. 8459 at 82-83, 100-04; 8470 at 16-20], and at trial
[R.7784-86; Tr. 8468 at 644-48].
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court err when it awarded to EPCO all of its attorney
fees when EPCO failed to differentiate between fees incurred in prosecuting compensable
and noncompensable claims? Moreover, did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees
to EPCO when EPCO filed an abusive lien, and when 51-SPR should have prevailed on
the other issues addressed by this appeal?
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (2001); Pochynok v. Smedsrud,
2003 UT App 375, 80 P.3d 563; A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen
Const., 1999 UT App 87, 977 P.2d 518; Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266
(Utah 1992); Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, 978 P.2d 470 (Utah
3

Ct. App. 1999); American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Comm. Corp., 939 P.2d 185
(UtahCt.App. 1997).
Standard of Review: An attorney fee decision that involves questions of law is
reviewed for correctness. A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47,
K 6, 94 P.3d 270. This issue was preserved in 51-SPR's memoranda [R.4379-80, 813336, 8316] and at trial [R.7778-79, 7773-74; Tr. 8468 at 48-51, 64-66, 73-75].
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions, which are of central importance to the appeal,
are set forth in their entirety in Addendum A:
1.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-3, -7, -18, -25 (2001) (mechanics' lien act)

2.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3.1(1), -4(2) (2002) (partnership act)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
EPCO, along with four of its subcontractors, Westwood Mill & Cabinet

("Westwood"), Hansen All Seasons Insulation ("Hansen"), Allstate Electric ("Allstate")
and Halverson Mechanical ("Halverson"), filed claims to foreclose their respective
mechanics' liens against 51-SPR's Northshore property. EPCO also brought claims
against Guy Hatch ("Hatch") and Broadstone Investments, L.C., ("Broadstone") for
failing to pay amounts due under the two construction contracts and for failing to obtain a
payment bond. [R.2740, 2745^-6.] EPCO brought the same claims against 51-SPR,
alleging that 51-SPR was Hatch and Broadstone's joint venturer. [Id.]

4

5
[R.564

.v*'i\ :.icd a separate a^ih.i. .*. . a was consolidated ii lto the present suit.
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them. [ D e f . E x s . 3 0 , 3 1 , 6 6 . ]
The trial court made a number of rulings before trial on various cross-motions for
s
Hatch and Broadstone, and tlms shared liability under Broadstone's construction
contracts with E P C O .

Second, the trial court held that E P C O ' s mechanics' lien was
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** Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment Against 51-SPR on Issue ofl.iabniiy
as Joint Venturer With and Partner of Broadstone at 12 (Jan. 4. 2003) ("Joint Vcn?-;Order") (Addendi nn B).
~'Order d r a i n i n g HPCO's Mono i u> Recon-nlc> on :i,v. I unehness of the
Mechanics' Liens at 2 i Jul\ l;. ?00.\) n icn Timelines < )i-i.-i ) (Addendum E).
Findings and i -..-.,.. 4. . J n n o f , "V->; • . * ( \,i . I U H I J I . . 5

against subcontractor claims and EPCO's guaranty that its subcontractors had been paid. 5
Fifth, the trial court dismissed EPCO's claim that 51-SPR failed to obtain a payment
bond. 6
After a three-day bench trial, the trial court denied 51-SPR's abusive lien claim,
holding that EPCO had acted in good faith in including the $78,000 in its lien claim.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 10-11 ffif 25-26 (May 18, 2004) (Addendum
I). Pursuant to its prior joint venture ruling, the trial court awarded damages against 51SPR on EPCO's breach of contract claim. fcL at 9 t 1 20-21. Then, rather than apply the
lien waivers to reduce EPCO's damages, the trial court entered judgment on EPCO's lien
foreclosure claim in the same amount. I d at 19 ^f 1. The trial court found EPCO to be
the prevailing party under the mechanics' lien statute, and awarded attorney fees for all of
EPCO's various claims. I d at 16-17 If 44; 17-18 ffif 4 5 ^ 7 .
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
E P C O ' s Dealings with Hatch - The Proposed Williams Property Development
Broadstone and Hatch developed a project in Utah County known as Broadstone

Square. [Tr. 8466 at 80-81, 87-88.] EPCO served as Hatch's general contractor on the
project. [Id.] In August 1999, in the course of that development, EPCO's president,
Richard Ellsworth ("Ellsworth") recommended that Hatch look at developing a parcel

^ Order Granting EPCO's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Indemnities at 2
(Dec. 31, 2003) ("Indemnity Order") (attached as Addendum G).
6

Order on EPCO's Failure to Obtain a Bond Claim at 2 (Feb. 9, 2004)
(Addendum H).
6

owned, by a Mr, Williams (tl le "Willi mis Proper! y"\ which neighbored EPCO's
Anu-i ;can i . ..

: i

]

Hatch later came to EPCO's office with a rendering he had obtained from Hubble
Engineering ("Hubble") of proposed office buildings on the Williams Property, and
requested tl lat EI}CO pay $ 78,000 foi de\ el.opm.ent w,-,. done on tlu

...i ru perly.

[Id :1 it 3 1 60 61, 6.5, 73 74 ; [>. f Ex 6.2 ] I h it< :1 u igi < * : it! i„ n 1 i< : w ( >i i.l,i Igi ^ t :: EI >CO ; „i
change order on the first building constructed on the Williams Property in exchange for
the payment, [Tr 8466 at 62, 67, 81.] Ellsworth testified at u .n mai JK- assumed that the
$78,000 < > i ui i„I,i

fi

it i

. . . .

•

65, 66, 78.] EPCO received u ui\[ l.om v intage Construction, Hatch* *> company, lui ihe
$78,000, and paid the invoice u ith a cheek In Vintage. [Id. at 64; Def. Ex. 28.] No
project \ ^ h i : \ f

.

,

]
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Several months later, I hitch solicited 5 1 -SPK to m\ est $2.9 million in a real estate
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agreement known as "Addendum No. .\" under w !ach 1 latch's company would construct
three commerce . . • ; n r ^ on tlic Ptoperty (to l>e known as "Bunding h
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VUentfiiii. K i

Addenduni No. 2 expressly required Broadsione and Hatch to bear the nsk of any
losses from the purchase and development of the Property, and expressly rehe\ ed 51

;

were responsible for purchasing the Property, obtaining construction financing, hiring a
general contractor, supervising construction, leasing the buildings, managing the
Property, and all other costs associated with the project. [R.1001 Tf 6.] 51-SPR and
Broadstone would hold the Property as tenants-in-common. [Add. K; R.1001 ^j 8.]
However, with the exception of one day on which title to the Property was vested in
Broadstone so it could secure construction financing, 51-SPR owned the Property at all
relevant times. [Tr. 8467 at 379-80.]
Broadstone entered into two construction agreements with EPCO ("Building I
Contract" and "Building II Contract") in March and August 2000, respectively, under
which EPCO agreed to act as general contractor in the construction of two buildings on
the Property ("Building I" and "Building II"). [Def. Exs. 3, 4.] To fund the construction,
Broadstone entered into two separate loan agreements with Central Bank roughly
equivalent to the amounts of the two construction contracts. Hatch and Dan Parkinson (a
co-member of Broadstone) guaranteed the loans. [Def. Exs. 1, 2; Tr. 8467 at 439-40.]
Central Bank's Payments and EPCO's Lien Waivers
During construction of each Building, EPCO prepared monthly payment
applications for Central Bank, each of which set forth the value of work performed
during that month and included the following signed certification:
The undersigned Contractor certifies that to the best of the Contractor's
knowledge, information and belief, the Work covered by this Application
for Payment has been completed in accordance with the Contract
Documents . . . .

8

[Def. Exs, 8, 9; Tr, 8467 at 464-65.] Throughout construction, EPCO also signed Central
Bai il :'s foi i i I rem lests for di aw s c : t i tl ic coi isti i I :tioi i. I :)aif i f'i u: i :is | Dei ' Exs 6. / ; I it 8 166
at I u A 04, I r. b4o7 ai 441 42.j Each draw request sought checks for EPCO, its
subcontractors, or Hatch-related entities, and contained the following certification:
We certify and represent mat an laoor ana materials for which these bills
are prestvMed have been usH i" iU'^ -*• v^-tv" <;-^ -*rthis referenced unit
[Def. Exs. 6, 7, It. 8466 at 1 u I U-i, i-4o; 11. 8407 at 4-1 * 4^.j froni the respective
construction loan funds, Central Bank issued checks as listed on the draw requests signed
by i i « • . ut-
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property against losses incurred liom claims by suppliers of laboi oi materials. <VA
representative Central Rank hen waiver is attached as Addcndi mi I .) EPCO endorsed
ai: id it legotiated cacl i cl icel ;: [D Mil 17; ;, Il 5. l(: ]
W o r k P e r f o r m e d o n t h e B u i l d i n g s Aftor I M a w R e q u e s t l);He*>
T h e value o f w o r k P P C O performed on i i i m m n g l a n e i Us linai. April ! 1. ^ 0 0 ] }
di a :" 'r i xp lest (v 4 lie 1 i >, 'as also tl it: date : 1 it :> 1< i s t li : i i ' r< iv 'ei ) * "} 'as SI9. 590 16. S ec 1- .: i it
111(A)(1), below, i iie valuo o; work EPCO performed oii Building 11 aitei its final, June
25, 2001, draw request (also the date of its last lien waiver) totaled $208,751.59. See
1
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:.:
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June 25, 2001, by EPCO's subcontractors, whom 51-SPR ultimately paid directly. See
Point 111(A)(4), below. EPCO had not paid its subcontractors in full through the dates of
its last draw requests on the two Buildings. See Point III(C), below.
Completion of the Buildings
EPCO's final payment applications show that work under the Building I Contract
was complete by May 31, 2001 [Def. Ex. 8], and work under the Building II Contract was
complete by July 31, 2001 [Def. Ex. 11]. While a few hours of work were performed
after those dates, the parties disputed whether such work was only trivial and
nonsubstantial, or outside the contract scope, and the when work under the two contracts
was accepted as complete by the owner. [R.3220-23, 4383-88, 5951-55, 6155-59.]
EPCO's final draws on the two Central Bank construction loans in April and June
2001, respectively, exhausted the loan funds. [Tr. 8467 at 440.] Notwithstanding a
deficiency under the construction contracts alleged by EPCO to be $850,651 [R.3034,
3284, 3286, 3328 1j 17], EPCO still proceeded to complete the Buildings. As it turns out,
EPCO had authorized during construction $835,990 in draws to Hatch's two companies,
Vintage and Broadstone—which were not EPCO subcontractors—for work that was
never performed on the two buildings. [Def. Ex. 35; Tr. 8466 at 107-08, 138-50.] As a
result of Hatch's looting of the construction loan proceeds, which EPCO authorized, the
construction loan proceeds were exhausted before EPCO and its subcontractors had been
completely paid.
In August or September 2001, 51-SPR became aware of Hatch's misappropriation
of construction funds, 51-SPR's principal Robert Chimento confronted Hatch, and Hatch
10
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h e h a s apparently remained ever since.
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loai is froi i i Cci iti al Bai ill ; [R 21 / 8 at 138 39 ] I c c t ' old foi eclosi n • i • : i i tl ie I }i :»pei t) ait id
the loss of its $2.9 million investment, 51-SPR entered into an agreement with Central
Bank to assume Broadstone's loan obligations. [Id ,]
M ec lit a nics' ' I Jens on the Pi opei t\
On Novembei i J, 2ow-+, EPCO filed a mechanics' lien against Building I and
Building II in the total amount of $850,65; "" T ; Fx H.l FPCO's lien included a
ciair. ui? ii, > > ' HIO paymei
p.. > '

«i • ,i
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,
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^i^n » compam
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,
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amounts claimed b\ EPCO's subcontractors, Hansen, Halverson, AlLuic, and
Westwood, ui.'.- * .u i. i.u-ii UK ir own mechanics' lions against the Buildings. [Id. at 96
9 7 | I IP( X ) i ICY ei par :! t :> tl ie si lbcoi iti actoi s tl ic ai i l :>i u its claii i v :xi ii :i tl I zh liei is [1 d _ ] 5 I
SPR requested that EPCO indemnify 51-SPR against the claims of the subcontractors, but
EPCO refused.. [R.3217, 7750.]
V 'iti i tl ie exceptioi i c >f EPCO, 51 SI *R \ lltii i latch - satisf ied tl ie • :laii i is o f every
mechanics' lien claimant that I latch and EPCO had hired to perform work on .no
Property, [Tr. 8467 at 516 20; see also note 17, below,] Several of tl ie subcontractors'
ck liii i is wei e litigated, ai id 51 SI fR ii ICI it it. ccl attoi i ie;; ' fees at id dai i lages litigatii ig tl lose
claims. [See note 1.7, below, R.7747, 7784.]
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SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT
On several bases, the trial court erred in denying 51-SPR's various claims and
defenses and entering judgment in favor of EPCO. First, the trial court erred in ruling as
a matter of law that a joint venture was created between 51-SPR and Broadstone and
Hatch because the agreement at issue specifically excludes an essential element of joint
venture—a duty to share in losses sustained by the development.
Second, the trial court incorrectly ruled on summary judgment that EPCO's lien
was timely when it was disputed when EPCO completed its work on the two buildings
and when the owner accepted EPCO's work as complete.
Third, the trial court erred in failing to apply the valid, enforceable lien waivers
that the trial court ruled on summary judgment to be binding and enforceable. The lien
waivers included provisions waiving lien rights with respect to 51-SPR's property,
indemnifying 51-SPR against subcontractor claims, and guaranteeing that all
subcontractors had been paid.
Fourth, the trial court incorrectly denied 51-SPR's abusive lien claim, which arose
from EPCO's effort to exact, through its lien, payment by 51-SPR of $78,000 that EPCO
had made to Hatch's company for work that benefited only the Williams Property, and
which was never even performed by EPCO.
Fifth, the trial court's award of attorney fees to EPCO should be reversed based on
EPCO's failure to differentiate among its various compensable and noncompensable
claims. Remand for a redetermination of attorney fees will also be necessary depending
on the outcome of this appeal.
12

ARGUMENT
L

THERE WAS NO JOIN I V EN I I JR E BE r FWFF>
BROADSTONE AND HA IXMI
A.

" ^r'

By shifting the Duty to Share Losses to Broadstone, Addendum No. 2
Expressly Precludes Any Finding of Joint Venture.

Because 5 I SPR had ••.-.) duty to share in losses of the Northshore project, the trial
court erred when it d a u m n K d on summary judgment that a joint venture was created
between

k

I SPR .111-1 \\Mr\\

and 1 ?.!u;s(k,ton

,\ dub, i

,1 i.u-• in fh< I ' 'ii1-- of (lie

enterprise is "essential" to establish a joint venture. Betenson v. Call Auto & Equip.
Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684. 6S6 (Utah iv,\/').
\ ei iti ii e abs< ;»

s

. .«

As a mattei of law. there can be no -i-m*

•; .r. .a i

;i IU- : • iv - cm ?e existed

where contract provision for "shared liability for losses" was "conspicuou ' j -

i1 • ^ ");

Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1. 2 (I 'tab 1 ° " 4 ) (holding thai no joint \ e n t u i e existed v\heie
defendant stone* u; M.,V. m-* investment in transactu-.i,. u , ,,^i ,,o duty to share m -..isuiess
losses).
Here, as in Betenson, there w a s in joint \eniuiv because the parties' agreement,
A d d e n d u m ; \ o 2. bestows on > I SPR v." rhty to share in losses and instead "specifically
excli n le[s] v si n I: , ; „. In it; /. 6 1 5 F ,|! 2 1 it 68( : : ^ < 1 , 1 1 1 Br< >; a 1; ;t< )i i< ;

i i< )t 51 SPR

was

solely responsible ioi all expenses costs, losses, and risks associated with the project.
[Id.; H !"ni « ' ' !t was Rroadstone, on its own behalf, which executed all of the
See also Johanson Bros. Builders v. Board of Review, 222 P.2d 503, M) / 11 UMI
lO^h (holding that no partnership existed where members of alleged partnership were
not chargeable w ith losses); First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Gillman, 158 B.R. 498, 509
(1). I !tah 1993) (holding tha! j«*int \ enlme did not iwisi under I hah la^ because theie was
no duty to share in other pari) \s losses). Cf, Utah Code Ann. i; 4S-1- :i it 2) (2«)0?)
(providing that joint \ e n i u r e is governed by I Mah Panm-islnp \ e t i.
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contracts associated with the Property, including loan documents, construction contracts,
construction loans, and tenant leases. [Add. K; R.lOOl ^ j 11-12.] Hatch and
Parkinson—Broadstone's principals—personally guaranteed the construction loans.
[Add. K; R.lOOl f 13.] 51-SPR was not a party to any of these guaranties or agreements.
[Add. K; R.lOOl fflf 14-15.] As a result, under the Agreement, 51-SPR stood to lose only
its investment in the Property and nothing more. [R.lOOl ^f 10.] Based on these facts, the
necessary duty to share in losses did not exist and as a matter of law, there could be no
joint venture.
However, disregarding the plain language of Addendum No. 2 and dismissing
Chimento's sworn testimony as "bald assertions," the trial court "inferred" a duty to share
in losses from three sources, not one of which is legally sufficient. Joint Venture Order at
9-11 (Add. B). First, the trial court inferred a duty to share in losses from 51-SPR's
agreement to mortgage its ownership in the Property so that Broadstone and Hatch could
secure construction financing. Id. at 10. However, by mortgaging its interest in the
Property (which had been purchased with 51-SPR's investment funds), 51-SPR stood to
lose only its investment and nothing more. As a matter of law, the risk of losing one's
investment does not evidence a duty to share in losses. See Bassett, 530 P.2d at 2. To
hold otherwise would turn into a partner the typical investor who stands to lose the extent
of its investment.
Second, the trial court inferred a duty to share losses from the fact that Broadstone
and 51-SPR were to hold the Property as tenants in common, which the court said brings
"all the accompanying liabilities of a real property owner." Joint Venture Order at 10
14

(Add B)

1 1 lis fact is immaterial because all common owners of real property are subject
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itself establish a partnership, even if there is a sharing of profits. See Utah Code Ann. §
48-1-4(2) (2002). Moreover, liabilities incidental to property ownership are not losses
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development. Based on express lam* uin-e of Addendum No. 2, 51-bPi- '' • ••• such duiv
Since E P C O cannot satisfy this essential element of joint venture, the joint venture claim
fails as a i r lattc i • : i la * : '
B•
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At M i n i m u m , "1 n a b l e issu.es Lxisted Regarding W hethei 51-SI Ml
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Chimento's affidavit testimony that Hatch and Broadstone were solely responsible for
"all expenses, costs, losses, and risks associated with the Northshore project." [R.1001 ^
6.] All inferences should have been viewed in 51-SPR's favor and any dispute of fact
precludes summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co.
v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995). Moreover, a joint venture
determination fails as a matter of law when there is no evidence to support an essential
element, see Bassett 530 P.2d at 2; Betenson, 645 P.2d at 686. A joint venture ordinarily
cannot be found as a matter of law because it involves questions of fact, see Rogers v.
M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987); Jaeger v. West. Rivers Fly Fisher,
855 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (D. Utah 1994). Here, the affidavit testimony and agreement at
minimum created a fact question whether 51-SPR agreed to a duty to share in losses. If
this Court does not hold that there was no joint venture as a matter of law, 51-SPR is
entitled to reversal of the Joint Venture Order and remand for an evidentiary hearing on
this issue.
II.

DISPUTED FACTS PRECLUDED ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE TIMELINESS OF EPCO'S MECHANICS' LIENS.
The trial court erred when it weighed evidence and determined on summary

judgment that EPCO's November 16, 2001, mechanics' lien was timely. Lien Timeliness
Order at 2 (Add. E). As this Court has recognized, the lien claimant must meet a twopronged, fact-intensive test when determining when the filing period for a mechanics'
lien begins to run:
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1.

The work "has been 'substantially completed,' leaving only
minor or trivial work to be accomplished"; and

2.

The work "has been accepted by the owner."

Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) ("Interiors I"). Here, the trial court even went so far as to enter what it
called "findings" on summary judgment with respect to these disputed issues of
completion and acceptance. 8 However, based on disputed facts with respect to both
prongs of Interiors I, summary judgment is precluded.
A.

The Parties Disputed the Final Completion Date of the Buildings.

Work is complete for purposes of the mechanics' lien statute when "only minor or
trivial work" remains. Interiors I, 827 P.2d at 966-67. Assessing whether work is minor
or trivial is a fact-sensitive issue that requires evidence-weighing: considering the work
performed in light of the value of the entire contract and the importance of the work on
the given project. Id. This first prong was only resolved in Interiors I after the court
weighed evidence at trial and entered express findings. See id.
In the present case, the parties hotly contested when work on both Buildings was
"substantially completed." 9 Interiors I, 827 P.2d at 965. The trial court wholly ignored

The "findings" were not based on any evidentiary hearing or presentation of
evidence, and were inappropriate on summary judgment. See Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt
Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1996) (trial court inappropriately entered
findings of fact in a summary judgment order).
The trial court correctly noted that the mechanics' lien statute in effect at the time
this action was filed provided that a notice of mechanics' lien must be filed within 90
days from the date of "final completion" of an original contract. See Ruling at 5 (Add.
C) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(b) (2001)). EPCO argued without any legislative
17

this when it ruled as a matter of law that substantial, nontrivial work was performed on
both Buildings within 90 days of EPCO's November 13, 2001, mechanics' lien notice.
L

The Parties Disputed the Date Building I Work Was Completed.

The fact disputes with respect to the completion of Building I work centered on
EPCO's own certification that its HVAC subcontract with Halverson was 100% complete
by March 2001, and the entire Building I Contract was 100% complete two months later.
[R.4310, 4320, 4400-01.] These certifications created a fact dispute whether work
performed after May 2001 was merely trivial or insubstantial, and even whether such
work was within the scope of the Building I Contract. If the work was outside the
contract scope or was merely trivial, its performance could not extend the 90-day period
within which EPCO could record a mechanics' lien.
Moreover, the only work that was allegedly performed on Building I after May 31,
2001, consisted of eleven hours—or about $550—of work performed by A&T,

history that the statute's reference to "final completion" suggested an intent to abrogate
nearly 70 years of Utah authority that trivial, nonsubstantial work does not toll the
deadline for filing a mechanics' lien. [R.6156.] The trial court never addressed EPCO's
argument, instead correctly focusing on whether EPCO's post-completion work was
trivial. See Ruling at 6-7 [R.5449-50]. In any event, EPCO's argument should be
rejected once and for all based on the legislature's two recent amendments to the statute,
which now expressly define "final completion" as the date on which (1) a final certificate
of occupancy is issued; (2) a certificate of final inspection is issued, or (3) no "substantial
work" is left to be performed. Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) (Supp. 2004) (including
both the amendment effective until May 1, 2005, and the amendment effective
thereafter), emphasis supplied. While these amendments are not binding in this case,
they are evidence of the legislature's intent when it used the term "final completion" in
the pertinent statute.
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Halverson's subcontractor. 10 [R.4401-04.] Notably, this work represented a smaller
percentage of the overall contract price—a mere 0.021% ($550 / $2.6 million)—than the
amount that this Court held to be "insubstantial and minor and trivial in nature" in
Interiors 1—0.031% ($28 / $90,000). 827 P.2d at 967 [R.5953 & n.2]. At the very least,
the trial court improperly held as a matter of law that the small amount of Building I
work performed after May 2001 was not trivial.
2.

The Parties Disputed the Date Building II Work Was
Completed.

Likewise, numerous fact disputes existed about when Building II work was
completed. First, while EPCO claimed on summary judgment to have performed work
on Building II within 90 days of its November 16, 2001, lien, EPCO had certified that the
Building II Contract was 100% complete—and a final retention was due—as of the end
of July 2001. [R.4300, 4398-99.] Other than the $78,000 change order for work
provided on the unrelated Williams Property, the only changes that appeared on EPCO's
final payment application after July 2001 were a net $806 in change orders—0.039%
($806 / $2,045,898) of the final contract price on Building II. [R.4302-06, 4392-4400;

The trial court seems to suggest that work in addition to A&T's was performed
on Building I after May 2001. See Findings and Order at 4 ^ 22 (Add. D) (providing that
"Ellsworth employees and its subcontractors were performing work on Building I in
September and October 2001"). However, there is no support for this statement in the
summary judgment record. Rather, as stated in EPCO's own summary judgment
memorandum and supporting affidavit, the work provided by EPCO in September and
October 2001 was on Building II—not Building I. [R.2977 at ^ 7; R.3028 at ^ 10.]
The trial court denied 51-SPR's motion to reconsider the timeliness rulings with
respect to Building I. See Order Denying 51-SPR's Motion to Reconsider the Rulings on
the Timeliness of Building I Liens at 2 (July 9, 2003) (Add. F).
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Def. Ex. 12.] These payment applications create a dispute whether work performed on
Building II within 90 days of EPCO's lien was trivial.
Second, for the three subcontractors that EPCO claimed to have performed work
after July 2001—Kimco, Clayco, and Design West—EPCO introduced no evidence that
any of their work was done pursuant to the Building II Contract. [R.43 86-87, 43924400.] The plans for Building II called for the construction of a building shell, and did
not include such tenant improvements as these three subcontractors would provide.
[R.4398-4400.] Tenant finishes were to be added later through change orders, and EPCO
was unable to show on summary judgment that the tenant improvement work of these
subcontractors was within the original contract scope or authorized by a valid change
order. Id. The work done by those subcontractors could well have been done under a
separate contract they performed for 51-SPR for tenant finish work. [R.4322 at 65-66.]
These disputed facts precluded summary judgment.
Third, the invoices of all three subcontractors reflect that they had completed all
their work by July 2001. [R.4392-96.] These invoices were sufficient to create a factual
dispute over the completion date.
Fourth, even if EPCO and its subcontractors' own records proved incorrect, the
subcontractors' own testimony creates disputes whether their post-July-2001 work was
merely nominal, remedial, or outside the scope of the Building II Contract. Kimco
testified that its entire fire sprinkler system was completely installed by July 2001,
leaving only "[f]inish and testing of the system, [and] passing it off with the city," and
other work outside the scope of the Contract. [R.4395.] Next, Clayco testified that it
20

only worked less than eighteen hours in September 2001. [R.4393.] Finally, Design
West conceded that its post-July-2001 time sheets referred only to work outside the
original Building II contract scope. [R.4392.] Based on this testimony, it remains in
dispute whether—and if so, how much—work was performed by the subcontractors
within the scope of the Building II Contract after they claimed their work was 100%
complete in July 2001. [R.4392-96.] On these alternative bases, summary judgment
with respect to the completion of Building II was inappropriate. The Court should
reverse and remand for trial on the issue of when completion occurred.
B.

The Parties Disputed the Date That Work Was Accepted.

The trial court all but ignored the second prong of Interiors I—acceptance by the
owner. The trial court recognized that acceptance by the owner was necessary and
opined with no analysis—and in spite of disputed facts—that acceptance for both
Buildings occurred only after A&T completed its eleven hours for Hatch on Building I.
See Ruling at 7 (Add. C). The trial court's ruling flatly contradicts this Court's rulings in
both Interiors I and Interiors II.
This Court held in Interiors I that the owner's recalling of the contractor to
perform additional work was not dispositive of acceptance. See 827 P.2d at 968-69.
Rather, evidence relevant to acceptance needed to be weighed and findings of fact
entered on remand. Id, The fact that the owner called the contractor back to perform
additional work and refused to pay the contractor until the work was completed were
insufficient to determine—as a matter of law—that the owner had accepted the work as
complete. kL
21

The exact same scenario presents itself here, where Hatch conditioned payment on
A&T's returning to perform additional work. [R.4401-04.] Under Interiors I, the trial
court was not entitled without more to rule as a matter of law on the issue of when
acceptance occurred.
The Interiors II case—which followed after Interiors I's remand—also shows the
trial court's error. There, findings of fact were entered on remand on the issue of
acceptance. Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d
929, 931-32 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Interiors II"). Even though the owner called the
contractor back to perform additional work and even conditioned payment on
performance of additional work, the additional work did not extend the time for filing a
mechanics' lien. Id. at 932-33. Rather, the work was accepted prior to the date the
contractor was called back to the job site by the owner. Id.
The relevant findings in Interiors II that suggested a prior acceptance (none of
which appeared alone to be dispositive) are similar to the instant case. For example, in
Interiors II, the contractor (not the owner) "considered the work completed and believed
that he was entitled to payment." I d at 932. Likewise, in this case, Halverson (whose
work A&T performed) and EPCO considered Halverson's work completed long before
A&T returned to the job in September 2001, a shown by EPCO's payment applications.
See Point 11(A)(1), above. Interiors II also found that tenants had moved into the
building. 881 P.2d at 932. Here, tenants moved into the building long before September
2001, and a certificate of occupancy had even been issued on Building I effective April
10, 2001. [R.855.] In sum, under Interiors II, the trial court could not rule on the
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acceptance issue as a matter of law. The Court should reverse and remand for trial on
when EPCO's work on the Buildings was accepted as complete.
III.

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF
THE LIEN WAIVERS EVEN AFTER CORRECTLY FINDING THE LIEN
WAIVERS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE,
One of the critical issues below involved the lien waivers printed on the reverse

side of the Central Bank checks that EPCO signed throughout the construction of the
Buildings. Like the virtually identical lien waivers that this Court upheld in the case of
Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193, 1194-95
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), absent some showing of fraud, EPCO is bound by each lien waiver
that it signed. Each lien waiver contained waiver, guaranty, and indemnity language.
[Add. L.] While the trial court initially—and correctly—found the lien waivers to be
valid and enforceable as a matter of law, the trial court erred when it subsequently
refused to apply them. As a result, this Court should reverse and remand with
instructions to apply the lien waivers.
A.

The Trial Court Should Have Applied the Waiver Provisions to
EPCO's Mechanics9 Lien Claim.

The trial court erred in entering judgment against 51-SPR on EPCO's lien
foreclosure claim without accounting for EPCO's knowing, voluntary waiver. Prior to
trial, the trial court had granted 51-SPR and Central Bank summary judgment that "[e]ach
of the checks prepared by Central Bank included language regarding the release of lien
rights," as follows:
In consideration of payment of this check, payee by negotiating this check
waives, releases, and relinquishes all rights of lien or claims payee may
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have up to the date of the draw request described on the reverse side hereof
(the "Draw Date"), upon the property described on the reverse side hereof
(the "Property").
Findings and Order at 3 ^J 11 (Add. D). With respect to this language, the trial court held:
By endorsing the Central Bank checks, Ellsworth [Paulsen] . . . waived [its]
claims and lien rights for work performed prior to the date that [its] draws
were requested . . . . The date of the draw request is the date on which
[EPCO] requested the draw, not the date the check was received or cashed.
I d at 6 f 1 (emphasis supplied).
The trial court's ruling was correct.

As the trial court observed in its

memorandum decision [R.5451-52], the waiver provisions of the Central Bank lien
waivers are virtually indistinguishable from those in Neiderhauser, which
"unambiguously waivefd] all lien rights accrued to the date of the waiver." 824 P.2d at
1196; see Ruling at 4-5 (Add. C). Under this ruling, EPCO was only entitled to recover
"the value of the services rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment
furnished" to the Property after the effective date of its lien waivers. Utah Code Ann. §
38-1-3(2002).
Inexplicably, however, the trial court completely failed to apply the waivers at
trial, notwithstanding uncontroverted evidence of the effective dates of EPCO's lien
waivers—April 11, 2001, for Building I and June 25, 2001, for Building II—and as
discussed below, the value of work performed from the dates of the lien waivers until
EPCO did not appeal from this ruling and, consequently, is not entitled to
challenge it in its cross-appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 3(d) ("The notice of appeal. . . shall
designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from."); Jensen v.
Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ffi| 5-9, 977 P.2d 474 (under Rule 3(d),
refusing to hear appeal from previous order that did not relate to verdict and order
identified in notice of appeal).
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completion of the two construction contracts. Because the trial court failed to apply the
lien waivers, the judgment on EPCO's lien foreclosure claim should be reversed.
1.

Uncontroverted Evidence Established That the Value of EPCO's
Work on Building I After the Draw Date Was $19,590.16.

According to the testimony of EPCO's employees, the value of work performed
on Building I from the April 11, 2001, lien waiver date until final completion was only
$19,590.16. [Def. Ex. 40.] EPCO's controller, Joe Brinkerhoff, testified that after March
31, 2001, the value of work performed on Building I was no greater than $23,900, as
reflected by the positive entries13 on EPCO's own final Building I payment application
for April and May 2001. [Def. Ex. 8; Tr. 8467 at 474-77.] Since EPCO did not maintain
any record of daily values, Brinkerhoff was aware of no better way to determine how
much of the $23,900 was performed from April 11, 2001 to May 31, 2001, than by
simply prorating over the 61-day period of April and May. [Tr. 8467 at 477-78.] Based
on a proration analysis, the total work performed from April 11, 2001, until final
completion was $19,590.16. [Tr. 8467 at 478-79; see also Def. Ex. 40 (summary of
proration analysis); Tr. 8467 at 497-99 (receipt of proration analysis).14]

The final Building I payment application shows total work performed after
March 2001 of negative $16,704, based on negative change orders accounted for in that
application. [Def. Ex. 8 at 6, Column E; Tr. 8467 at 475-76.] When negative change
orders for the period are removed, the amount of work performed in the period (as listed
in Column E) totals $23,900. [Def. Ex. 8 at 2-6, Column E; Tr. 8467 at 477.]
Defendant's Exhibit 40 also summarized a proration analysis that deducted
disputed change orders, but those Building I change orders are not disputed in this appeal.
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2.

Incontroverted Evidence Established That the Value of EPCO's
Work on Building II After the Draw Date Was $208,751.59.

The analysis for Building II was the same, albeit involving three payment
applications, numbered 8, 9, and 10, for the period after the June 25, 2001, lien waiver
date on Building II. [Def. Ex. 10 (application no. 8—June 2001); Def. Ex. 11
(application no. 9—July 2001); Def. Ex. 12 (application no. 10—August 2001).] First,
EPCO's Joe Brinkerhoff testified that the positive entries on application no. 8 for work
performed in June 2001 totaled $339,736.31. [Def. Ex. 10 at CB 52 (page 5 of app. no.
8); Def. Ex. 37 at 2 (summary of app. no. 8); Tr. 8467 at 488-89.] Prorating this amount
over the 30 days in June 2001 provides a daily amount of $11,324.54, which for the final
five days in June after the draw date of June 25, 2001, totals $56,622.72. [Def. Ex. 37 at
3; Tr. 8467 at 489.]
Second, Brinkerhoff testified that the positive entries on application no. 9 for work
performed in July 2001 totaled $149,936.87. [Def. Ex. 11 at 5 (app. no. 9); Def. Ex. 38 at
2 (summary of app. no. 9); Tr. 8467 at 491-92.]
Third, Brinkerhoff stated that the positive time entries on application no. 10 for
work on the remainder of the Building II Contract totaled $80,192. [Def. Ex. 12 at 5
(app. no. 10); Def. Ex. 39 (summary of app. no. 10); Tr. 8467 at 488-89.] However, of
this amount, $78,000 arises from the change order for work performed on the Williams
Property, which the trial court correctly determined is not chargeable to 51-SPR's
property. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 ^j 21 (May 18, 2004) (Add.
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I); Def. Ex. 39. Deducting the $78,000 change order from the $80,192 in positive entries
on application no. 10 leaves $2192.
In sum, based on these three final payment applications on Building II, the
summaries thereof, and Brinkerhoff s testimony, the value of work performed after the
date of EPCO's last lien waiver on Building II (June 25, 2001) totaled $208,751.59
($56,622.72 + $149,936.87 + $2192).
3.

Judgment on EPCO's Mechanics' Lien Claims Should Not Have
Exceeded the Uncontroverted Value of Work That Was Not
Waived.

Rather than enter separate judgments on EPCO's contract claim and mechanics'
lien claim, the trial court conflated the two claims. The trial court found that the balances
due under the two construction contracts were $199,830.53 on Building I and
$364,991.26 on Building II. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4 ^f 1 (Add. I).
These amounts were derived simply from EPCO's collection reports, which did not
reflect any amounts waived by the lien waivers. See PL Ex. 5 at 2-3 (showing amounts
due on Building I for payment app. nos. 7 and 8, which were entirely waived, and
payment app. no. 9, which was partially waived, see Point 111(A)(1), above); PL Ex. 6 at
2-3 (showing amounts due on Building II for payment app. no. 8, which was partially
waived, see Point 111(A)(2), above). The trial court failed to enter a separate judgment on
the mechanics' lien claim that took into account the application of the lien waivers.
Notwithstanding uncontroverted evidence of the value of work performed on the two
Buildings after the dates of the lien waivers—$19,590.16 and $208,751.59,
respectively—the trial court merely entered judgment on the mechanics' lien claim for
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the contract balances. This Court should reverse and remand with instructions to apply
the lien waivers according to the uncontro verted evidence of the value of work performed
after the applicable draw dates.
4.

The Mechanics1 Lien Claims Should Also Be Reduced to the
Extent They Include Work Performed by EPCO's
Subcontractors, Whom 51-SPR Has Paid.

The trial court should have gone even one step further in calculating the amount of
EPCO's mechanics' lien. 51-SPR presented uncontroverted testimony from three of
EPCO's own subcontractors—Halverson, Allstate, and Westwood, each of whom 51SPR paid in full by the time of trial—that they had performed $94,402 in work under the
Building II Contract after June 25, 2001,which was the Draw Date on Building II. [Tr.
8468 at 661-62.]
First, Blair Halverson of A&T (Halverson's subcontractor) testified that at least
$6,000 of A&T's work under the Building II Contract was performed after June 25, 2001.
[Tr. 8467 at 505-06.] Second, Melanie Prawitt from Westwood testified that Westwood
performed $32,879 in work under the Building II Contract after June 25, 2001 (in July
2001). [Tr. 8468 at 539^0; Def. Ex. 41.] Third, Lee Barnes of Allstate Electric testified
that Allstate performed $55,523,17 in work under the Building II Contract after June 25,
2001.15 [Tr. 8468 at 581-82; Def. Ex. 67.] None of this evidence was controverted.
The value of work performed by these subcontractors on Building II after the lien
waiver date of June 25, 2001—totaling $94,402—is included in the $208,751.59 figure

Like Brinkerhoff, Barnes' calculation included a proration of Allstate's June
2001 invoice. [Tr. 8468 at 578-81; Def. Ex. 67 (summarizing Def. Ex. 44).]
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(work performed by EPCO and its subcontractors after June 25, 2001). And, EPCO did
not dispute at trial that 51-SPR paid these three subcontractors in full, and that EPCO was
not entitled to recover for their work. [Tr. 8466 at 6; Tr. 8467 at 528-30; Def. Ex. 67.]
The trial court erred by not reducing EPCO's mechanics' lien claim on Building II from
$208,751.59 to $114,349.59, to avoid providing a recovery to EPCO for work performed
by its subcontractors after June 25, 2001, which 51-SPR paid in full.
B.

The Trial Court Erred When It Refused to Enforce the Plain,
Unambiguous Indemnity Provision of the Lien Waivers Against EPCO,

The trial court erred when it cast aside plain, unambiguous indemnity language in
the lien waivers and determined on summary judgment that EPCO had no duty to
indemnify 51-SPR against the claims of EPCO's subcontractors. 16 See Indemnity Order
at 2 (Add. G). The indemnity provision in the lien waivers signed by EPCO plainly
requires EPCO to indemnify and hold harmless 51-SPR—the property owner—from any
claims by EPCO's subcontractors:
Payee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the owner of the Property and
Central Bank or its assigns from any loss, claims, or expenses incurred by

51-SPR moved for summary judgment on the indemnity language and the
warranty and guaranty language [R.3217-18], and EPCO failed to address these issues
[R.4707-08]. When the court asked why EPCO had not briefed that issue, EPCO's
counsel explained the omission by stating, "That specific area wasn't responded to
because we deemed it without merit. We actually thought that it was so trivial and so on
the fringe of an argument that it would not be seriously considered." [Tr. 8464 at 17:1114.] It was error for the trial court not to enter summary judgment at that point based on
EPCO's nonresponse. At a later oral argument, when 51-SPR requested a ruling
enforcing the indemnity, warranty, and guaranty language the trial court invited
supplemental briefing. [Tr. 8470 at 33.] After supplemental briefing [R.7746-51] and
oral argument [Tr. 8471 at 4 4 ^ 6 ] , the trial court denied 51-SPR's motion [id. at 47;
Indemnity Order at 2 (Add. G)].
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them by reason of or rising out of any liens or claims made against the
Property by any supplier of labor or material at the insistence of payee.
[Add. L, emphasis supplied.] Like any other contract, an indemnity agreement is
interpreted according to its plain language. Gate City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dalton,
808 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 51-SPR was a third-party beneficiary to the
indemnity provision. See Broadwater v. Old Rep. Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah 1993)
(third party beneficiary exists where contract shows that contracting parties "clearly
intended to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the third party").
Absent some showing that the indemnity language is ambiguous—there has been
none—indemnification is required as a matter of law. Moreover, as evidenced by the fact
that 51-SPR defended against and settled subcontractor claims, see note 17, below, it
cannot be disputed that EPCO has failed to indemnify 51-SPR. The trial court failed to
enforce this provision, instead simply adopted three of EPCO's legally insufficient
arguments for denying indemnification. See Indemnity Order at 2 (Add. G).
First, the trial court opined that 51-SPR "did not pay the contract balances" and
that such payment "is a condition precedent to the indemnity claim." IcL This position is
meritless. "The intention to create a condition in a contract must appear expressly or by
clear implication." Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1978). EPCO has not
pointed to any language in lien waivers (much less the separate construction contracts to
which 51-SPR was not a party) that conditions indemnification on payment under the
construction contracts. [R. 7762-65.] Indeed, the indemnity is absolute, unconditional,
and enforceable.
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Second, the trial court cited an alleged lack of consideration. See Indemnity Order
at 2 (Add. G). This is unavailing. Consideration may be found when "there is any act or
forbearance bargained for and given in exchange for the promise of another." Peirce v.
Pdrce, 2000 UT 7, t 21, 994 P.2d 193 (emphasis supplied). Here, as the lien waiver
itself confirms, the consideration for each lien waiver (including the indemnity provision)
is the corresponding payment EPCO received from Central Bank. [Add. L. (stating that
lien waivers are "[i]n consideration of payment of this check").] Central Bank owed no
legal obligation to EPCO nor its subcontractors to issue checks. Rather, Central Bank's
only duties stemmed from a contractual relationship it had with Broadstone, the account
holder. Thus, the very issuance of the checks constitutes sufficient consideration to
validate and enforce EPCO's duty to indemnify.
Third, the trial court suggested that 51-SPR has not suffered damages from the
failure to indemnify. See Indemnity Order at 2 (Add. G). This basis also fails. Four
EPCO subcontractors filed or foreclosed on mechanics' liens on the Property totaling
$242,538. [Def. Ex. 47.] EPCO did not pay anything toward those subcontractor claims.
[Tr. 8466 at 97.] Instead, 51-SPR defended against them and ultimately settled with all
four subcontractors for the aggregate sum of $442,283.58.17 While the principal amount
of $242,538 was offset against EPCO's judgment [PI. Ex. 27], the difference paid to the
i n

After obtaining a judgment of foreclosure [Def. Ex. 25], Allstate and Westwood
executed on letters of credit securing the judgment in the amounts of $187,500 and
$52,602, respectively [Def. Ex. 31 at \ \ D; R.4105-06, 4149-50], and received
additional settlement payments from 51-SPR of $26,594.87 and $41,985.71, respectively
[Def. Ex. 31 at 2 1f 6]. Hansen and Halverson's claims were settled by 51-SPR for
$10,601 and $123,000, respectively. [Def. Exs. 30 at 2 \ 2(c), 66 at 2 ^ 2.] These
payments to subcontractors totaled $442,283.58.
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subcontractors—$199,745.58—has never been accounted to 51-SPR, nor have 51-SPR's
costs and attorney fees in defending against those claims.
51-SPR is not asserting that the indemnity language eliminates its liability for the
value of the subcontractors' work. Rather, if EPCO could show that the subcontractors'
work was performed and within the scope of the Contracts, EPCO would have been able
to include the value of such work—up to the $242,538 the subcontractors claimed—in its
own lien foreclosure claims to the extent EPCO had not waived its lien rights. Had
EPCO assumed the defense of the subcontractor claims, as it was invited to do by 51-SPR
[R.3217, 7750], the additional damages incurred by 51-SPR could have been spared.
In sum, by agreeing to indemnify 51-SPR, EPCO agreed to be the party who
would settle and incur the costs of settling the subcontractors' claims. By failing to settle
those claims, EPCO is liable to 51-SPR. This Court should reverse the trial court's
summary denial of indemnity and remand for a trial on 51-SPR's damages for EPCO's
breach of the indemnity provision.
C-

The Trial Court Erred When It Refused to Enforce Against EPCO the
Guaranty and W a r r a n t y Language in the Lien Waivers.

The trial court also erred in refusing to enforce against EPCO the warranty and
guaranty in the lien waivers that provided as follows:
Payee warrants and guarantees under penalty of fraud that payment in full
has been made by payee to the suppliers of all labor and materials to the
Property incurred up to the Draw Date at the insistence of payee.
[Add. L.] Lumping this language together with the indemnity language discussed in
Point III(B), above, the trial court rejected 51-SPR's claim as a matter of law. Yet,
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neither EPCO nor the trial court offered any basis for not enforcing this provision of the
lien waiver. Like the other language on the lien waiver, the warranty and guaranty
language is plain, unambiguous, and enforceable.
EPCO has not disputed 51-SPR's showing that EPCO had not paid its
subcontractors through the applicable draw dates. [R.3217-18, 4707-08.] Nor did
EPCO dispute at trial that 51-SPR paid all amounts claimed by EPCO's subcontractors,
totaling $242,538 [Tr. 8466 at 96-97; PL Ex. 27, Def. Ex. 47], and that $94,402 of this
amount was performed after the June 25, 2001, draw date on Building II (see Point
111(A)(4), above). Had EPCO paid its subcontractors in full as it warranted and
guaranteed, 51-SPR would not have had to pay the difference of $148,136—i.e., the
value of work performed up to the draw date. The trial court should have found that
EPCO breached the warranty and guaranty, and should have awarded $148,136 in
damages. This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling dismissing the warranty and
guaranty claim, and remand with instructions to enter judgment in this amount or, at
minimum, to hold a trial on 51-SPR's damages.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD EPCO LIABLE FOR
FILING AN ABUSIVE LIEN OF $78,000 FOR WORK PERFORMED ON
THE WILLIAMS PROPERTY,
EPCO's lien on the Northshore property included the sum of $78,000 for work

performed by Hatch's company, Vintage Construction, on the Williams property.
Vintage invoiced EPCO in that amount, which EPCO paid. The trial court was correct to
bar EPCO from recovering the $78,000 through EPCO's lien foreclosure claim, but erred
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in refusing to hold EPCO liable under the abusive lien statute for including this amount in
its lien on 51-SPR's Property.
A.

EPCO Could Not Lien the Property for the $78,000 Paid to Vintaee.

A contractor has no lien rights in property that did not benefit from the
contractor's work. A contractor can only file a lien "upon the property upon or
concerning which [the contractor itself has] rendered service, performed labor, or
furnished or rented materials or equipment." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (2001). While a
contractor may lien for services even if a planned building is never constructed, the lien
must be filed on "the property concerning which he has rendered professional services."
Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 464 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1970).
Richard Ellsworth himself conceded that he knew the $78,000 payment to Vintage
was not based on work provided by EPCO or its subcontractors. [Tr. 8466 at 85-86.]
Based on this simple admission that EPCO was merely reimbursing someone else who
allegedly performed work, EPCO could not claim a mechanics' lien under section 38-1-3
on any property. This is not all. The work—if it occurred at all—related to the Williams
Property and thus provided no benefit at all to 51-SPR's Property. [Tr. 8466 at 61, 65,
66, 78, 261, 270-72.] Based on uncontroverted facts, EPCO could not lien 51-SPR's
property for the $78,000. The trial court agreed. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 7^1 12 (Add. I).
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B,

The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Conclude That by Claiming a Lien
on 51-SPR's Property for the $78,000 Paid to Vintage, EPCO Is Liable
Under 38-1-25,

By attempting to exact through its lien on 51-SPR's property the $78,000 paid to
Vintage, EPCO violated the abusive lien statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 (2001)
(reprinted in Addendum A(3)). 51-SPR is aware of only two reported Utah decisions that
have cited section 38-1-25 since it was enacted, and both warn that contractors risk
liability when they lien property that has not benefited from their work. See J. Pochynok
Co. v. Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, t 19, 80 P.3d 563 (addressing 2001 amendment that
added section 38-1-25(2), stating that "it is clear the intent of the amendment is to
discourage outrageous lien claims and to encourage the settlement of lawsuits which are
of minor financial value"); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT
47, Tj 24 & n.6, 94 P.3d 270, (observing that abusive lien statute "has the effect of
discouraging abuse of the lien process by creating a strong disincentive for a would-be
litigant to wrongly inflict a mechanics' lien on a property owner whose property was not
actually enhanced"); Tr. 8468 at 649-51 (addressing Pochynok). Admittedly, since
neither Pochynok nor Whipple required an application of section 38-1-25, the present
case is one of first impression, albeit guided by applicable statutory intent and policy
recognized in those two cases.
Here, every element of section 38-1-25 is satisfied. First, EPCO is a "person
entitled to record or file a lien." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(1). EPCO constructed
Building I and Building II and thus is entitled to file a lien claim to the extent it provided
work and did not waive its lien rights.
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Second, it is undisputed that EPCO "intentionally cause[d] a claim of lien against
[51-SPR's] property." Id. EPCO does not contest that it filed an $850,651 mechanics'
lien against Building I and Building II. [Tr. 8466 at 68-69, 77; PL Ex. 13.]
Third, EPCO's lien "contains a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or
filed." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(1). Richard Ellsworth conceded that EPCO's lien
included a claim for the $78,000 payment to Vintage. [Tr. 8466 at 77-78.] EPCO's
demand was greater than the sum due because, as discussed in Point IV(A), above, and as
the trial court found (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 7 Tf 12), EPCO was not
entitled to claim a lien for the $78,000 against 51-SPR's Property.
Last, by overstating its lien, EPCO sought to exact from 51-SPR, the owner, by
means of the excessive claim of lien more than is due. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25. This
fact cannot be refuted. Based on Richard Ellsworth's own testimony at trial, EPCO used
the lien to force the owner of the Property—51-SPR—to pay the $78,000. He testified:
Q.
The lien that EPCO recorded on the North Shore project that
was built included this $78,000; isn't that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When EPCO recorded that lien it intended to seek payment of
that sum from the owner; isn't that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
[W]hat you're saying is that EPCO intended to force—to use
the force of the lien to force the owner of the North Shore property to pay
that sum?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And even today EPCO is claiming that it's entitled to lien the
North Shore property in that amount?
A.
Yes.
[Tr. 8466 at 77-78.]
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Based on these facts, as the plain language and legislative history of section 38-125 both provide, EPCO should be penalized for "asserting] a claim for much more than
[it] is legitimately owed," Pochynok, 2003 UT App 375 at Tf 18, and "wrongly inflict[ing]
a mechanics' lien on a property owner whose property was not actually enhanced,"
Whipple, 2004 UT 47 at ^ 24. EPCO should have been found liable to 51-SPR under
section 38-1-25 for two times the amount by which the lien including the $78,000 claim
was overstated—$156,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(2). This Court should
reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment against EPCO in that amount
under the abusive lien statute.
C.

The Findings Relied on by the Trial Court in Denying the Abusive Lien
Claim with Respect to the $78,000 Claim Were Clearly Erroneous and
Immaterial.

The trial court based its denial of the abusive lien claim on six findings of fact:
that (1) Hatch instructed Ellsworth to file the lien for $78,000 [Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ^ 23, 25 (Add. I)]; (2) Ellsworth acted in good faith [id.]; (3)
Ellsworth did not intend to cloud the title, exact more than it believed was due, or procure
an unjustified advantage [id. 1fl| 24, 25, 26]; (4) Hatch—not 51-SPR—owned the Property
[id ffif 2, 25]; (5) the $78,000 was paid to Hatch and Broadstone [id If 22]; and (6)
Ellsworth assumed that the $78,000 was possibly for Building II [id. ^ 2]. Not only are
these findings clearly erroneous, but several are also materially irrelevant. Each finding
is properly challenged below with marshaled evidence from the trial court record. See
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (marshaling requirement).
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1.

The Findings That Hatch Instructed Ellsworth to File the
Mechanics' Lien Including the $78,000 Is Clearly Erroneous
(Findings 23 and 25).

The trial court relied in part on a finding that EPCO liened 51-SPR's property at
the instruction of Hatch. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at ^ 23, 25 (Add.
I). However, there was no evidence that Mr. Hatch ever directed Ellsworth to file a lien
on the Northshore Property, much less a lien that included the $78,000. Only the
following relevant evidence can be marshaled:
1.
In August 1999, Hatch requested that Ellsworth pay the $78,000 to
Vintage for design and engineering costs on the Williams Property [Tr. 8466 at 34,
61-62];
2.
Ellsworth "assumed" that the $78,000 was for design and
engineering work on the Williams Property [icL at 61, 65, 66, 78, 81];
3.
Ellsworth agreed at the time to pay the money in exchange for a
change order on the first building constructed on the Williams Property [id at 62,
67,81];
4.

The Williams Property was never developed [id at 81];

5.
In February 2001, after Ellsworth prepared a change order on
Building I of 51-SPR's property, Hatch told Ellsworth that the change order has to
be on Building II [id at 62];
6.
Ellsworth prepared a change order on Building II of 51-SPR's
property for the $78,000, which Hatch signed [id. at 62; Def. Ex. 26]; and
7.
Hatch indicated that if Building III did not become a reality, the
change order would apply to Building II [Tr. 8466 at 83-84].
In sum, there was no evidence that Hatch directed EPCO to file the improper mechanics'
lien. The trial court could not infer such a fact from Hatch's mere authorization of a
change order on the Building II Contract. This finding is clearly erroneous and should be
vacated. In any event, the finding that Hatch, the developer, instructed EPCO to file the
38

lien claim is immaterial to section 38-1-25. It is no defense under this statute that the
developer instructed the contractor to file a lien.
2.

The Findings Regarding EPCO's "Good Faith" in Filing the
Lien Are Clearly Erroneous and Immaterial (Findings 23 and
251-

The trial court relied in part on a finding that EPCO "acted in good faith" when
EPCO intentionally included the $78,000 claim in its mechanics' lien, "not knowing"
whether the $78,000 payment benefited 51-SPR's property. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ^j 23, 25 (Add. I). The only evidence to be marshaled in support of
this finding is the same as set forth in Point IV(C)(1), above—none of which is legally
sufficient to make a finding of good faith. The fact that Hatch signed a change order on
Building II does not show EPCO's good faith because EPCO had no authority
whatsoever to file a mechanics' lien against the property for the $78,000. See Point
IV(A), above. A lien can only be recorded against property that was improved,
regardless of what agreement the parties may have reached. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-13 (2001).
Moreover, the trial court's related, tacit suggestion that Ellsworth may have
believed at the time that the money was for work on 51-SPR's Northshore Property has
no evidentiary support at all. The payment took place long before the development of 51SPR's property began. [Tr. 8466 at 78-80.] Further, Ellsworth's only testimony about
what he believed the money was for is that he "assumed" it was for work performed on
the Williams Property. [Id. at 61, 65, 66, 78, 81.] The trial court could not infer from
this evidence that EPCO "believed" that the money benefited 51-SPR's property. The
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findings in paragraphs 23 and 25 regarding Ellsworth's state of mind are clearly
erroneous and should be vacated.
In any event, even if there were evidence in the record that EPCO believed it was
entitled to file the lien for $78,000, there is no "good faith" defense under the statute for
those who are ignorant of the legal implications of their improper liens. EPCO's defense
to the abusive lien claim is akin to that raised by the lender in Rossberg v. Holesapple,
who accepted a usurious loan payment, only to claim that he lacked the specific intent to
violate the usury law and did not understand what constituted usury. 260 P.2d 563, 566,
123 Utah 544, 549 (1953). The Supreme Court held that even if the facts were as the
lender alleged, the lender was liable because the necessary intent to "constitute usury is
simply the intent to take and reserve more than permitted by law for the loan" and
"[ijgnorance of the law excuses no one, not even an honest money lender." Id (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
Likewise, all that matters here is that EPCO intentionally filed a lien that included
a $78,000 claim for which EPCO had no right to claim a lien. See Point IV(B), above.
As a result, judgment on the abusive lien claim was appropriate regardless of EPCO's
alleged "good faith."
3.

The Finding That EPCO Lacked Intent Is Clearly Erroneous
and Immaterial (Findings 24 and 25).

In denying 51-SPR's claim under the abusive lien statute, the trial court found that
in filing its lien, EPCO did not "intend" to exact "more than it believed was due" from
51-SPR. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^[ 24, 25 (Add. I). However, the
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statute does not condition liability on a lien claimant's subjective belief whether it is
seeking more than is due. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25; see also Point IV(C)(2),
above. Nor does the statute require a showing that the contractor specifically "intend" to
exact more than is due. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25.
This part of the trial court's ruling poses an issue of first impression in Utah,
namely whether the intent requirement in the statute refers to the act of causing the lien to
be filed, or whether as the trial court's ruling implicitly suggests, there must also be a
specific intent to exact more than is due. Based on the plain language of the statute, the
"intent" requirement is satisfied by simply showing that the contractor "intentionally
causes a claim of lien against any property." Id. As with the usury statute analyzed by
the Supreme Court in Holesapple (see Subpart 2, above), section 38-1-25 imposes no
duty on the owner to show specific intent to violate the abusive lien statute.
Juxtaposing an "intent" requirement within the three subparts, (a), (b), and (c) of
18

section 38-1-25(1) would render the statute impermissibly redundant.

This is because

subpart (a) also includes the words "with the intent." IcL § 38-l-25(l)(a) ("with the intent
to cloud the title"). If the word "intentionally" in the statute were a modifier of the three
subparts, then "intent" would be redundant and superfluous because "intentionally" and
"with intent" mean the same thing.

16

See State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("'Whenever
possible, statutes should be construed so that no portion is superfluous,' and, as such,
they should not be read to include a pure redundancy.") (quoting Beynon v. St. GeorgeDixie Lodge # 1743, B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 513, 518 n.21 (Utah 1993)).
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The only way to prevent such a redundancy is to construe "intentionally" in
subsection (1) simply as a modifier of the language that immediately follows—"causes a
claim of lien against any property." I d § 38-1-25(1). Such a construction serves the
policies recognized in Pochynok and Whipple, discussed in Point IV(B), above, of
discouraging contractors from filing overstated liens. It was 51-SPR's burden to prove
that EPCO intentionally filed its lien, the lien contained a greater demand than the sum
due, and the lien sought to exact from 51-SPR by means of the excessive claim of lien
more than is due. As discussed in Point IV(B), above, 51-SPR satisfied its burden.
Since the trial court read an intent requirement into the subparts of section 38-125(1) that does not exist, the trial court's finding that EPCO did not "intend" to exact
"more than it believed was due" (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^} 24, 25
(Add. I)) is immaterial and should not have precluded judgment against EPCO on the
abusive lien claim under section 38-l-25(l)(b).
However, even if some degree of intent can be read into subpart (l)(b) of the
statute, the trial court's finding that there was no such intent is clearly erroneous.
Marshaling the evidence supporting a finding of "no intent" is to prove a negative.
EPCO never provided any testimony that it did not intend to exact more than was due
from 51-SPR. Instead, the only evidence related to EPCO's intent was that EPCO knew
that the $78,000 payment was for the Williams Property for work done by Hubble
Engineering, not EPCO, but that EPCO still intended to include this sum in its
mechanics' lien against 51-SPR's property and exact this amount from 51-SPR. See
Point IV(A)-(B), above. Based on these uncontroverted facts, the trial court should have
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found that EPCO intended to exact from 51-SPR more than was due, even if such a
statutory requirement existed. In sum, the finding of fact to the contrary was clearly
erroneous and should be vacated.
4.

The Trial Court Clearly Erred in Finding That Hatch Owned
the Property (Findings 2 and 25).

The trial court found that Hatch is "the primary principal and owner of the
property for Buildings I and II." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^f 2 (Add. I);
see also id^ ^[ 25 (also referring to Hatch as "owner"). However, there was no such
evidence at trial. Rather, the uncontroverted evidence at trial was that except for one day
when Broadstone was deeded the property so it could secure construction financing in
Broadstone's name, title to the Property has been vested in 51-SPR. [Tr. 8467 at 37980.] Moreover, it was established that in August or September 2001, any interest Hatch
or Broadstone had in the project was entirely relinquished to 51-SPR. [Id at 386.] The
finding that Hatch was the owner is clearly erroneous. In any event, as discussed in Part
B, above, EPCO had no right to claim a lien on the property anyway since it had provided
no improvements whatsoever. Hatch's ownership is immaterial.
5.

The Trial Court Clearly Erred in Finding That the $78,000 Was
Paid to "Hatch and Broadstone" (Finding 22).

The trial court also confused the facts when it found that the $78,000 "was paid by
EPCO to Hatch and Broadstone." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^j 22 (Add.
I). This finding is clearly erroneous because Ellsworth admitted that it was Vintage that
invoiced EPCO for this amount and Vintage whom EPCO then paid. [Def. Ex. 28; Tr.
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8466 at 63-64.] In all events, this finding is immaterial because whomever EPCO paid,
EPCO had no right to lien the Property as a result of having made this payment.
6.

The Trial Court Clearly Erred in Finding That Ellsworth
Assumed the $78,000 Was "Possibly for Building I F and That
the Rendering Included Buildings I and II (Finding No. 2),

The trial court's confusion is readily apparent in its finding that the rendering that
Hatch provided to EPCO included "Buildings I and II on the property in question" and
that Hatch proposed that Ellsworth pay Vintage for what Ellsworth assumed to be "costs
for the Williams property and possibly for Building II" Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ^f 2 (Add. I) (emphasis supplied). This finding tacitly implies that
Ellsworth believed the costs he was paying to Vintage were for work on Building II of
51-SPR 's property, which was not the case. Yet, there is no evidence in the trial court
record that can be marshaled in support of this finding.
Ellsworth was unequivocal in his testimony that the building on which he expected
to receive a change order at the time he paid Vintage was a proposed building on the
Williams property. 19 [Tr. 8466 at 81.] While EPCO ultimately received a change order
on 51-SPR's Property [id.], which was not developed until several months later in March
2000 [Tr. 8466 at 64, 79-80; Def. Ex. 28], Ellsworth reiterated that he assumed EPCO's
payment was for the Williams property [id. at 61, 65, 66, 78].

This testimony also clarifies the trial court's Finding No. 3 that Hatch instructed
Ellsworth that a change order could be applied on Building II for $78,000. See Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4 ^j 3 (Add. I). This statement was made well after
EPCO paid Vintage. When EPCO paid the money to Vintage, it expected a change order
on the Williams Property, and only received a change order on Building II because the
Williams Property was not developed. [Tr. 8466 at 81.]
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The trial court's confusion may derive from the fact that the proposed "North
Shore" rendering on the Williams Property, which EPCO received before paying Vintage
in August 1999, referred to buildings as "Building #1," "Building #2," etc. [Tr. 8466 at
60, 65, 73; Def. Ex. 62.] But again, the rendering was for the Williams Property—not
51-SPR's property [id.], and as the architect Mark Wilson testified, such renderings are
not interchangeable between properties [Tr. 8466 at 271-72].

The trial court's finding

that Ellsworth assumed his payment was for Building II and that the rendering he was
shown was for 51-SPR's property is clearly erroneous and should be vacated.

V.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO EPCO SHOULD BE
REVERSED,
A,

The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Attorney Fees for
Noncompensable Claims.
Even assuming all of the trial court's other legal rulings were correct, the

trial court still erred when it awarded all of EPCO's attorney fees, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 17-18 ^j 45-47 (Add. I), notwithstanding EPCO's lack of success
on several claims and EPCO's failure to allocate its fees among compensable and
noncompensable claims. "Utah adheres to the well-established rule that attorney fees
generally cannot be recovered unless provided for by statute or by contract." Canyon
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1989). Moreover, a party claiming
fees must "allocate its request for fees according to its underlying claim[s]." A.K. & R.

While the Hubble rendering and Vintage invoice referenced "Northshore" [Def.
Exs. 28, 62], those references were to the proposed Williams Property development [Tr.
8466 at 33-34, 65, 73, 80-81], and not to 51-SPR's property, which Hatch initially
intended to develop under the name "Northshore" [Id. at 34].
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Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const., 1999 UT App 87, t 32, 977 P.2d 518.
Specifically, the party must "differentiate between the fees and time expended for '(1)
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful
claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims
been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement for attorney fees.'" Id.
(quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992)).21 This fee
allocation requirement "also obligates the trial court to make findings which closely
resemble the requesting party's allocation of fees on each claim." I d ; see also Foote v.
Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) ("Where the parties evidentiary submissions in
support of a request for attorney fees are deficient, so will be the court's evaluation of
those fees.").
Here, EPCO brought numerous claims, three of which involved a statutory basis
for fees—mechanics' lien foreclosure, failure to obtain a bond, and withholding of
retention proceeds —and several others that lacked a basis for attorney fees—breach of
contract, quantum meruit, fraudulent transfer, misrepresentation, and tortious
interference. [R.8134-35.] Of these claims, EPCO prevailed only on the mechanics' lien

21

See also Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, H 15, 978 P.2d
470 (holding that one seeking attorneys' fees "must reasonably allocate time incurred
between compensable and non-compensable claims").
22

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-18(1), (mechanics' lien statute), 14-2-2(3)
(payment bond statute), 13-8-5(10) (withheld retention proceeds statute). 51-SPR is
entitled to attorney fees incurred in connection with claims on which 51-SPR prevailed,
including the retention and payment bond claims.
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and breach of contract claims. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 19 ^f 1
(Add. I).
Yet, besides removing some (but not all) of its fees relating to the payment bond
claim on which 51-SPR prevailed,23 EPCO failed to separate its attorney fees among
these multiple claims. The affidavit does not separate fees incurred in prosecuting the
claims on which EPCO did not prevail (failure to obtain a bond, withholding of retention
proceeds, quantum meruit, fraudulent transfer, misrepresentation, and tortious
interference), and does not separately allocate the fees incurred on the contract claim and
mechanics' lien claim. [R.8302ffif11-12; R.8134-35.] Instead, EPCO makes the
conclusory statement that all of its claims are "directly or indirectly related" to its lien
claims. [R.8302 ^f 12.] This, of course, is not what Utah law requires.
Even if EPCO is the prevailing party under the mechanics' lien statute, EPCO was
not entitled to recover fees for prevailing on the breach of contract claim, for which there
was no contractual attorney fee provision. [Def. Exs. 3, 4; R.8134-35, 8316.] The same
was true in American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Comm. Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 192
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), in which there was no applicable provision for attorney fees in the
parties' construction contract. This Court held that while the lien claimant prevailed on
the mechanics' lien foreclosure claim, it was "not entitled under section 38-1-18 to
attorney fees incurred in pursuing its nonlien claims which were 'completely separate'

See R.8302 ^|j 11-12 (purportedly removing payment-bond-claim-related fees).
But see, e.g., R.8229 (billing $1,564.00 for "[w]ork[ing] for entire day and into the night
researching and writing renewed motion for summary judgment on the failure to obtain a
bond claim").
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from the lien claims." I d at 193. The Court should reverse the award of attorney fees
with instructions to remand for a proper allocation among EPCO's various claims.
B.

The $78,000 Abusive Lien Bars Any Fee Award to EPCO.

In the event 51-SPR prevails on the abusive lien claim on appeal, the entire award
of attorney fees to EPCO must be vacated because an abusive lien is an absolute bar to
recovery of attorney fees on a mechanics' lien foreclosure claim. See Utah Code Ann. §
38-1-18(2). The inequity of EPCO's abusive lien and accompanying fees claim is
precisely what section 38-1-18(2) was intended to prevent. 2
C.

After the Appeal, Remand Will Be Necessary to Reassess Whether 51SPR or E P C O is the Prevailing Party.

Depending on the outcome of the issues raised by this appeal, the Court will likely
need to vacate the trial court's award of attorney fees and remand so that the trial court
can reassess who the prevailing party is on the one compensable claim on which EPCO
prevailed—its mechanics' lien claim. Utah courts apply a "flexible and reasoned
approach" to determining which party is the "successful party" for purposes of awarding
attorney fees under the mechanics' lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). Whipple,
2004 UT 47, Tf 26, 94 P.3d 270. This "common sense" approach requires "not only

This Court found "instructive" a note proposing the amendment and speaking to
the bill's intent, which stated:
In my view, the primary inequity in the mechanics' lien law as it currently
operates is that a party can assert a claim for much more than he or she is
legitimately owed forcing a defendant to litigate the claim, and yet still be
entitled to attorney[] fees as the "prevailing party" even if the lien claimant
only recovers a fraction of what was originally claimed.
Pochynok, 2003 UT App 375 at Tf 18.
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consideration of the significance of the net judgment in the case, but also 'looking at the
amounts actually sought and then balancing them proportionally with what was
recovered.'" Id. (quoting A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT
App 73, U 19, 47 P.3d 92). Since the trial court is in the best position to make this
analysis, see id at ^f 26, remand is necessary.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Appellant 51-SPR-L.L.C. respectfully requests that
this Court enter an Order (1) reversing the judgment on EPCO's contract claim based on
the trial court's erroneous ruling on the joint venture issue; (2) reversing the judgment on
EPCO's mechanics' lien claim and remand for trial on the timeliness of EPCO's lien; (3)
remanding for application of the lien waivers and assessment of 51-SPR's damages under
the warranty, guaranty, and indemnity provisions; (4) reversing the dismissal of 51-SPR's
joint venture claim; and (5) reversing the award of attorney fees and remanding for a
proper allocation of fees. Moreover, to the extent 51-SPR prevails on any of the issues
raised by this appeal, 51-SPR requests the attorney fees incurred on appeal and a remand
for a reassessment of who is the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees.
siDATED this 2 1 day of January, 2005.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P,C.

R. Stephen Marshall V_J
Erik A. Olson
Attorneys for Appellant 51-SPR-L.L.C.
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Tab A

Those entitled to lien—What may be attached
Utah Code § 38-1-3
UTAH CODE, 1953
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 38. LIENS
CHAPTER 1. MECHANICS' LIENS
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp Sess

§ 38-1-3. Those entitled to lien—What may be attached
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or
renting any materials or equipment used m the construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to any premises m any manner and licensed architects and
engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings,
estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional
service, or bestowed labor, shall have a hen upon the property upon or concerning which they
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for the
value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by
each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his
authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as the hen is barred under Section 38-11-107
of the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This hen shall attach only to
such interest as the owner may have in the property.
As last amended by Chapter 308, Laws of Utah 1994

Search this disc for cases citing this section.

Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of propertyUtah Code § 38-1-7
UTAH CODE, 1953
W E S T S UTAH CODE
TITLE 38. LIENS
CHAPTER 1. MECHANICS' LIENS
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp Sess

§ 38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of property.
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record w th the county recorder
of the county m which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to
hold and claim a lien withm 90 days from the date:
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a
project or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as defined m Section
38-11-102.
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1), shall contain a statement setting forth:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom the hen claimant was employed or to whom the hen
claimant furnished the equipment or material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last
equipment or material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification;
(e) the name, current address, and current phone number of the hen claimant;
(f) the signature of the hen claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent;
(g) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of
Documents, and
(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement
describing what steps an owner, as defined m Section 38-11-102, may take to require a hen
claimant to remove the hen in accordance with Section 38-11-107
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), an acknowledgment or certificate is not required for any
notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989.
(4) (a) Withm 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the hen claimant shall deliver or mail by
certified mail a copy of the notice of hen to

(l) the reputed owner of the real property; or
(n) the record owner of the real property.
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the hen claimant, the copy
of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the
affected property is located.
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of hen to the reputed owner or record owner precludes
the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record
owner m an action to enforce the hen.
(5) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing the
form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(h).
Amended by Laws 1994, c 308, Laws 1995, c 172, § 1, eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1998, c 49, § 1, eff July 1, 1998,
Laws 1999, c 223, § 1, eff May 3, 1999
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Attorneys' fees—Offer of judgment.
Utah Code § 38-1-18
UTAH CODE, 1953
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 38. LIENS
CHAPTER 1. MECHANICS 1 LIENS
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 38-1-18. Attorneys' fees—Offer of judgment
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action brought to
enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-1-25 is not entitled to
recover attorneys' fees under Subsection (1).
(3) A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien under this chapter may make
an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is not
accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the
offeree shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offeror after the offer was made.
Amended by Laws 1961, c. 76; Laws 1995, c. 172, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2001, c. 257, § 1, eff April 30, 2001.
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Abuse of lien right—Penalty.
Utah Code § 38-1-25
UTAH CODE, 1953
WEST f S UTAH CODE
TITLE 38, LIENS
CHAPTER 1. MECHANICS' LIENS
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 38-1-25. Abuse of lien right—Penalty.
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any property, which contains a
greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or filed:
(a) with the intent to cloud the title;
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive claim of lien more
than is due; or
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit.
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who violates
Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an original contractor or subcontractor
who is affected by the hen for the greater of:
(a) twice the amount by which the wrongful hen exceeds the amount actually due; or
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the property.
Amended by Laws 1997, c 125, § 1, eff May 5, 1997, Laws 2001, c 257, § 2, eff April 30, 2001
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Tab 2

Joint venture defined—Application of chapter
Utah Code § 48-1-3.1
UTAH CODE, 1953
WESTS UTAH CODE
TITLE 48. PARTNERSHIP
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS
PART 1. GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 48-1-3.1. Joint venture defined—Application of chapter
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a
single business enterprise.
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of joint ventures.
As enacted by Chapter 14, Laws of Utah 1985.
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Rules for determining the existence of a partnership
Utah Code § 48-1-4
UTAH CODE, 1953
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 48. PARTNERSHIP
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS
PART 1. GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
Current through End of 2003 2nd Sp Sess

§ 48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a partnership
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by section 48-1-13, persons who are not partners as to each other are
not partners as to third persons.
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy m common, tenancy by entireties, joint property, common
property, or part ownership does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-owners do
or do not share any profits made by the use of the property.
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the
persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any properly from which the
returns are derived
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that
he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such pi ofits were received
m payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise.
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord.
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner.
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment vary with the profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will of a business or other property by
installments or otherwise
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
Plaintiff,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST 51-SPR ON ISSUE OF
LIABILITY AS JOINT
vs.
VENTURER WITH AND
PARTNER OF BROADSTONE
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK, a
Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE
Civil No. 020400442
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE,
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD MILL
Civil No. 010405059
& CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation;
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L.
Consolidated into
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH;
Civil No. 010405059
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah
coiporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR
Judge Schofield
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah
coiporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS
INSULATION; DECORATIVE
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation; the
DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual;
JOHN DOES 1-20 and all other persons
unknown claiming any interest to the subject
real property,
Defendants.
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ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Ellsworth Paulsen
Construction Company on the issue of 51-SPR LLC's liability as joint venturer, partner or successor
in relation to Broadstone Investments, LC based upon a ruling by the Court dated December 30,
2002.
This case is before the court on Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Service's ("EPCO") May 24,
2002 motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendant 51-SPR-LLC's ("51-SPR" or
"Chimento") liability as a joint venturer, partner, or successor in relation to Broadstone Investments,
LC ("Broadstone").1 51-SPR opposes the motion.
Having reviewed the parties' respective memoranda, and the evidence on file, and heard oral
argument on the matter, I now issue this ruling granting the motion.
In essence, EPCO asserts that it has not been paid certain sums due for construction services
performed on the Northshore I and II commercial real estate development project (the "Project")
pursuant to contracts and related change orders signed by Broadstone or its agents. If Broadstone
and 51-SPR were partners or joint venturers on the Project, 51-SPR is jointly and severally liable for
all debts chargeable to the partnership or joint venture, including the sums due to EPCO under the
contracts to develop the Project. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-10 to -12; Hoth v. WJiite, 799 P.2d 213,
218 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-10 tp -12).
1

The central issue before the court has been cast principally as one of joint venture.
However, in footnote 2 of its supplemental supporting memorandum, counsel for EPCO correctly
notes that "partnership law and joint venture law are essentially indistinguishable." (citing
Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 882 fn. 3 (Utah 1983). See also Utah Code Ann § 481-3.1; Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah App. 1990) ("[§48-1-3.1] provides that joint
ventures are governed by the partnership act.").
2
:
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Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Where the motion for summary judgment is supported by evidence and
sworn testimony, as is the case here, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon mere
allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact to be tried. See
Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983).
Whether or not there was a joint venture relationship is a factual question. Rogers v. M.O.
Bitner, Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1932 (Utah 1987). However, in this case, where the "facts are not in
dispute . . . the relationship of the parties is a matter of law." Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah
1974).
Joint Venture Factors.
The Utah Code defines "joint venture" as "an association of two or more persons to carry on
as co-owners of a single business enterprise." Utah Code Ann. §48-1-3.1. The Utah Supreme Court
has declared Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) to be the "leading case in Utah defining the
elements essential to a joint venture." Betenson v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales, 645 P.2d 684,686
(Utah 1982). Bassett states:
A joint venture is an agreement between two or more persons
ordinarily but not necessarily limited to a single transaction for the
purpose of making a profit. The requirements for the relationship are
not exactly defined, but certain elements are essential: The parties
must combine their property, money, effects, skill, labor, and
3

knowledge. AS a general rule, there must be a community of interest
in the performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary
interest in the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share
in the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a duty
to share in any losses which may be sustained.
530 P.2d at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). In Rogers v. M.O, Bitner, the court states that "[a] joint venture
does not always rise pursuant to formal agreement; rather, it is a relationship voluntarily entered by
the parties and may be proven by the actions taken by the parties. The characterizations given by the
parties are certainly not determinative of the issue." 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (emphasis added).
In this case both the written agreements and the parties' undisputed actions indicate that 51SPR was not merely Broadstone's creditor, but that 51-SPR was actively involved with Broadstone
in the business of developing and maintaining the Project in anticipation of earning a profit. While
Broadstone was the principal supplier of skill, labor, and knowledge as an on-site project manager,
51-SPR was the principal supplier of capital to the venture. Both parties had a common inte4rest
in the Project and each expected to participate in the profits expected to follow.
Background and Addendum #2,
In April 2000, Guy Hatch (of Broadstone) and Chimento met with Ford Motor Company
("Ford") for the purpose of acquiring the real property upon which the Northshore I and II buildings
were constructed. While 51-SPR insists that Hatch met with Ford before Chimento did, Chimento
admits to being "involved in the acquisition of the property, in putting it under contract." The real
estate purchase agreement ("RESPA") lists the purchase price of the Northshore property at
$1,750,000.00. On June 12, 2000, Ford conveyed the Northshore property to Broadstone by
warranty deed.
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It is undisputed that Broadstone and 51 South Portland Realty executed Addendum #2 to the
RESPA (the "Agreement"), labeled "DATED June 15, 2000" at the top of the document. It is also
undisputed that all of 51 South Portland Realty's interest in the Agreement is now owned by 51-SPR
and that the term "Chimento" in the Agreement refers to 51 South Portland Realty.
The Agreement undisputedly provides that 1) The parties would own the Northshore property
as tenants in common; 2) 51-SPR would contribute $2.9 million, of which $1.75 million would be
used to acquire the land, and another $1.2 million would be applied to site work and construction
costs; 3) Broadstone would be the "project manager," would "operate the venture," would obtain
long term financing, enter into construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on
the buildings; 4) Chimento would execute a mortgage to secure institutional construction financing;
5) Chimento funds for site development and construction costs ("hard" costs only) would be utilized
"on a standard draw schedule . . . after inspection approval by a Chimento engineer"; 6) Broadstone
would be a single member single purpose company, whose "ownership interest and control shall be
pledged to Chimento to secure [its] obligations"; and 7) Broadstone would "mortgage its tenancy in
common interest to Chimento [51]SPR] to secure the pledge and restriction agreements as well [as]
Hatch's obligations."2
The Agreement also provides:
[1] The parties intend that following completion of the project... but not earlier that
1/1/2001, as they may hereafter agree, Chimento and [Broadstone] may transfer their
interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equally by them, otherwise consistent with
2

See 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial
summary judgment, pp. 8-9. These are the undisputed characterizations of the items in
Addendum #2.
5
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the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shall be held for investment and
all actions by the parties shall be in furtherance of that goal. (Agreement p. 2, %4)\
[2] Chimento shall receive a 10% return on its capital commencing December 1,
2000 through the end of the first year following closing . . . to be p>aid monthly . ..
. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be paid from operating income of the project,
if sufficient, and if not, then from proceeds of a sale of a portion of the land . . . if
any, [Broadstone} shall contribute any and all sums to the project needed to payment
of such return. (Agreement p.2, ^6);
[3] Any net operating income remaining in the first year [shall be paid] to Hatch [of
Broadstone]. (Agreement p. 2, fl)-9
[4] Chimento shall have the option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second
year on terms set forth above for year 1, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of
the project. . . (Agreement p. 2, ^8);
[5] Thereafter Chimento and [Broadstone] shall share 50/50 in net operating income
of the project. (Agreement p. 2,16);
[6] Permanent financing will "take out" all financed construction costs... the project
. . . will secure the same . . . . The parties agree to consult as to the amount of
permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if agreed, such excess to be
applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse the following order as available, (i)
land closing costs; (ii) allocated construction costs, i.e. building 1 and building 2; (iii)
allocated site improvement costs, i.e. building 1 and building 2; and after Chimento
capital repaid in full, to each 50/50. (Agreement p.2, ^[10;
[7] Subsequent capital transactions (refinances, sales, casualty or condemnation) after
debt repayment to: (i) remaining unpaid Chimento capital; and thereafter (ii) to each
50/50. (Agreement p. 3, <[1);
[8] All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made after consultation.
(Agreement p. 3, <P);
[9] Monthly construction and leasing reports to be submitted by Haich. (Agreement
p. 3,14); and
[10] Hatch development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter into a consulting
agreement with Chimentos, individually, with regard to property development
inclusive of the project, to a term running through March 1, 2001, for a fee of
6
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$24,000.00 per month payable monthly commencing July 1, 2000 (except the July
1 2000 payment shall be $12,000.00. (Agreement p. 3, f9).
Joint proprietary interest in the subject matter.
While joint tenancy alone does not of itself create a joint venture or partnership,351-SPR's
proprietary interests in the Project severely undermines its assertions that it was merely a "creditor"
or "investor" on the Project. 51-SPR does not dispute that both parties had ownership interests in
the Project, at the outset.4 And since December 13, 2000, 51-SPR has owned the property in fee
simple except for one day.5 It is undisputed that as of November, 2002, "[t]he Northshore building
II is 100% occupied, and the Northshore Building I is approximately 70% occupied [and] 51-SPR
receives about $70,000 per month for tenants, but pays $20,000 or $30,000 to the bank to debt
service the construction loan."6
Mutual right to control.

3

Utah Code Ann. §48-1-4.

4

According to counsel for 51-SPR, "Mr Chimento testified that, after discovering
Broadstone and Hatch's misappropriation, breach of duty, and fraud, he believed that
Broadstone's interest in the property should be surrendered to 50-SPR." 51-SPR's response to
EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p. 15. However,
"the surrender of Broadstone's interest in the Property has been called into question by Dan
Parkinson." Id. (citing Chimento Aff. at 125). I note that regardless of the current ownership
status of the property (at worst 51-SPR retains a one-half interest), the undisputed facts satisfy
the "joint proprietary interest" factor in determining joint venture status.
5

51-SPR does not dispute that at the end of January, 2001, it conveyed the property to
Broadstone and Broadstone reconveyed the Property to 50-SPR the next day. 51-SPR's response
to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p. 12.
6

Id., p. 16,111. (citing Chimento Dep. P. 125-26).
7

As an owner of the Project property, 51-SPR had the right to control the activities relating
to the Project. Nothing in the parties' Agreement abrogated 51-SPR's right to control, but only
insured that right. While Broadstone had authority to obtain long term financing, enter into
construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on the buildings, it was required to
"pledge" its "ownership interest and control . . . to Chimento" (Agreement p. 2, <J[1) (emphasis
added).7 Significantly, the Agreement provided: "All decisions regarding the project shall be
mutually made after consultation." (Agreement p. 3, f 3) (emphasis added).
51-SPR asserts that Chimento rarely visited the construction site, and did not actually
"approve" construction draws, and that he did not believe he had veto power over the tenants on his
property. Even if these assertions are true, the degree of control actually exercised by 51-SPR is not
determinative of the control factor. The terms of the Agreement, together wnth 51-SPR's ownership
of the property, unquestionably gave 51-SPR the right to exercise mutual control on "all decisions
regarding the project."
In addition, 51-SPR had the right to receive monthly reports from Broadstone under the
Agreement. It is undisputed that Chimento visited the construction site at least six times, and
reviewed leases and construction draws to "keep abreast of the management" of the Project.8 Given
both the terms of the Agreement and the actual control9 exerted by 51-SPR in this case, I simply

7

This suggests that Broadstone was an agent for 51-SPR.

8

51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial
summary judgment, p. 24.
9

Counsel for 51-SPR admits that when 51-SPR "discovered Broadstone's fraud" it then
"executed the Termination of Co-Ownership Agreement" and now collects monthly rents on the
8
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cannot credit 51-SPR's conclusory allegation that Broadstone "had sole responsibility and authority
to develop and manage the Property."10
Right to share in the profits.
Utah law provides: "the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima
facie evidence that he is a partner in the business," Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4(4). While I do not
address whether "profits" were actually received in this case, the Agreement gave both parties the
right to share in the profits from the Project. The Agreement provided that 51-SPR would receive
a monthly 10% "return on its capital" to be guaranteed by Broadstone. Any net operating income
remaining in the first year would go to Broadstone. The second year, 51-SPR would have the option
to receive a 10% "return on its capital" or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project.
Thereafter the parties were "to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project." (Agreement p.
2, %8) (emphasis added). Mr. Chimento himself, acknowledged the 50/50 arrangement in his
deposition.11
A duty to share in any losses which may be sustained.
51-SPR argues that it "never agreed to share in any losses incurred by Broadstone," but that
it "merely agreed to serve as an investor or financier in the development of the Property."12 Mr.

property.
10

51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial
summary judgment, p. 24.
11

Chimento Dep. pp. 137-138.

12

51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial
summary judgment, p. 20.
9
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Chimento's affidavit sates: "51-SPR was not liable or responsible for any losses, liabilities, or
responsibilities relating to the Property, and under its arrangement with Broadstone, stood to lose
only its investment in the Property and nothing more."13 While these bald assertions contradict
EPCO's position, they do not create any genuine issue of material fact. 51-SPR's denials of liability
are simply conclusory allegations which are sharply contradicted by both the terms of the Agreement
and the undisputed facts.
The terms of the Agreement, 51-SPR's ownership interest in the Project, and 51-SPR's
undisputed actions all gave rise to 51-SPR's duty to share in any losses which may be sustained by
the Project. There is no indication from the facts that the parties expected the Project to be anything
less than profitable, thus it is no surprise that loss-sharing duties were not spelled out in detail.
However, the Agreement essentially put 51-SPR's $2.9 million immediately at risk should the
venture completely fail. In addition, the Agreement made 51-SPR one-half owner14 of a tenancy in
common with all the accompanying liabilities of a real property owner, including applicable tax and
tort liabilities. The Agreement did not purport to limit Chimento's duty to share losses by providing
that "Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy in common interest to secure institutional
construction financing but will not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee at any time."

13

Chimento affidavit, 1 10.

14

In addition, by its terms, the Agreement required that Broadstone's "ownership interest
and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure [its] and Hatch's obligations," and that
"[Broadstone] shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest to Chimento . . ." (Agreement, p. 2
TI1-2).
10
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(Agreement, p. 1, f 1) (emphasis added).15 However, 51-SPR apparently ignored or waived this
provision when it agreed with Central Bank in April, 2002 to guarantee "Broadstone's" #4.3 million
construction loans.
Simply put, the Agreement and the undisputed facts demonstrate that this is not a case of 51SPR acting as a simple creditor to Broadstone. 51-SPR insists that it only guaranteed Broadstone's
loans to avoid foreclosure. One may wonder, however, whether foreclosure would have been so
great a concern if, as it alleges, 51-SPR was merely a secured creditor in a priority position. In fact,
however, 51-SPR voluntarily conveyed the Project property to Broadstone for one day in January
2001 so that Broadstone could secure additional financing for the Project. In doing so, 51-SPR
voluntarily put its own property at greater risk of loss in furtherance of the joint venture.
The parties' characterizations.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that "[t]he characterizations given by the parties
are certainly not determinative" of the joint venture relationship. Rogers v. M.O. Bitner, 738 P.2d
1029, 1032. Thus, it is not dispositive to the joint venture or partnership determination that the
Agreement provided that the project would merely be "held for investment" or that the parties' tax
returns would "reflect that the property is held as tenants-in-common interests and not as a
partnership."16 In contrast, 51-SPR's letter written by Robert Chimento to Richard Ellsworth on

15

A partial limitation on 51-SPR's liability for losses would not preclude a finding of
joint venture under the Basset factors. In making the joint venture determination, the duty to
share losses is a factor "unless there is an agreement to the contrary." Bassett v. Baker, P.2d
(emphasis added).
16

Agreement, p. 2, f 4 and p. 3, <H 7-8.
11
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October 9, 2001 is telling Mr Chimento's letter discusses the "handling" of the pioject by Guy
Hatch and later states
Please realize that it was never our intent to be late in our payments to anyone, and
we certainly had good reasons to support the statements we made to you that led you
to believe that you would be paid by now If not for the economic uncertainty
resulting from the 9/11 attacks, our Buyer and/or our permanent financing would
have closed by now
(emphasis added)
Whether these written statements create partnership by estoppel,17 they demonstrate Mr Chimento' s
understanding of 51-SPR's joint obligation to EPCO for work performed on the Project18
CONCLUSION
Based on the undisputed material facts, I grant EPCO's motion for partial summary
judgment 51-SPR is liable to EPCO as a joint venturer or partner with regard to services rendered
pursuant to the contracts and change orders executed between Broadstone and EPCO relating to the
Project l9

17

See Utah Code Ann §48-1-13 "When a person by words spoken or written or by
conduct represents himself
to anyone as a partner
he is liable to an/ such person to whom
such representation has been made who has on the faith of such representation given credit to the
actual or apparent partnership
When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were
an actual member of the partnership
When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly
with the other persons
so consenting to the
representation as to incur liability, otherwise
separately" Id
18

Interestingly, in the same letter, Mr Chimento suggests that "[ajnother possibility" to
ensure EPCO's receipt of payment "is a partnership of some kind " Chimento suggests, "perhaps
we could both make a profit "
19

While I believe it may be possible to conclude that 51-SPR was the pnncipal owner of
the Project with Broadstone merely acting as its agent, I do not make that finding today Because
I find 51-SPR liable to EPCO as a partner or joint venturer with Broadstone, I do not reach the
12

Dated this

4

. Day of January, 2003.
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Judge Anthony Wj. Schofield

APPROVED AS TO FORM

•Steve-MarstrarrAttorney for 51-SPRlTL.C.

issue of successor liability at this time.
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TabC

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

A
Vj

ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al.,
RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 010405059
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC,
et al.,

Judge Gary D. Stott

Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' and Defendants' motions for summary
judgment. The Court having heard oral argument on March 6, 2003, having considered the
informationfiledby the parties and the relevant case law and statutory provisions, and being fully
advised, issues the following:
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Defendant Broadstone Investments, L.C., ("Broadstone") entered into two agreements
with the plaintiff, Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth Paulson"), under which
Ellsworth Paulsen agreed to act as general contractor in the construction of two buildings on a
real estate development located in American Fork, Utah known as the North Shore Project (the
"Property"). The contract for construction of thefirstbuilding was dated March 22, 2000, and
the contract for construction of the second building was dated September 12, 2000. To fund the
construction of the two buildings ("Building T and "Building IT'), Broadstone entered into two
separate loan agreements with Central Bank, and Central Bank recorded a separate Deed of Trust
for each building.
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Ellsworth Paulsen entered into agreements with various subcontractors, including,
Halverson Mechanical, Inc., ("Halverson"), Allstate Electric, Inc., ("Allstate"), Westwood Mill &
Cabinet., ("Westwood"), and Masco Contractor Services, Inc., dba Hansen-All Seasons
Insulation ("Hansen"), to provide labor and/or services for the construction of the buildings.
During construction, Ellsworth Paulsen or Broadstone would submit periodic Draw Requests to
Central Bank requesting payments for Ellsworth Paulsen and its subcontractors for work
performed on the buildings. Ellsworth Paulsen or Broadstone dated each Diraw Request and
specified on the Draw Request whether the draw was for Building I or Building II. Ellsworth
Paulsen or Broadstone also periodically completed and submitted to Central Bank the AIA
Document G702, an Application and Certificate for Payment ("AIA Payment Application"),
which set forth in detail the total work completed with respect to the construction agreement, the
amounts of approved change orders, and any payment due for the relevant time period.
An appropriate bank officer would review each Draw Request and AIA Payment
Application received by Central Bank and give approval before Central Bank could disperse the
loan proceeds to Broadstone, Ellsworth Paulsen, or any subcontractors. After approval, Central
Bank provided to Ellsworth Paulsen corresponding checks drawn on either ttie Building I loan or
the Building II loan, as appropriate, which Ellsworth Paulsen could then distribute to its
subcontractors. The face of each check bore the account number for the respective loan on which
they were drawn, and above the endorser signature line on the reverse side of each check was the
following lien release provision:
In consideration of payment of this check, payee by negotiating this check waives,
releases, and relinquishes allrightof lien or claims payee may have up> to the date of the
draw request described on the reverse side hereof (the "Draw Date"), upon the property
described on the reverse side hereof (the "Property"). The payee certifies that this check
is payment for labor and materials that were actually performed upon and furnished to the
Property. Payee warrants and guarantees under penalty offraudthat payment in full has
been made by payee to the suppliers of all labor and materials to the Property incurred up
Ruling Page 2
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to the Draw Date at the insistence of payee. Payee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless
the owner of the Property and Central Bank or its assigns from any loss, claims, or
expenses incurred by them of or rising out of any liens or claims made against the Property
by any supplier of labor or material at the insistence of payee. This instrument shall not be
negotiated if any of the above language has been stricken or modified by the payee or
endorser.
Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, Allstate, and Hansen allege that they have not
been paid for all work performed on the Property, and have filed mechanic's lien notices for the
unpaid labor or services to the Property. Central Bank and 51-SPR-LLC ("51-SPR"), co-owner
and joint venturer with Broadstone, argue that such liens are invalid based upon the lien waiver
language printed on the reverse side of the Central Bank checks and the alleged untimeliness of
the mechanic's liens. The lien holders, however, assert that the liens werefiledtimely and that the
lien waiver language on the checks is ambiguous and unenforceable, and in any event, 51-SPR is
liable for the amount owed under the liens because it failed to obtain a payment bond as required
by statute. Summary judgment is sought on the matter by all parties.
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen. 27 P.3d 555, 558 (Utah 2001)
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Under this standard, the Court will review the following issues:
whether the Plaintiffs waived their right to file mechanic's liens on the Property; whether the
mechanic's liens were timely filed; and whether Defendant was required to obtain a payment
bond.

Ruling Page 3
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n. LIEN WAIVERS
51-SPR and Central Bank claim that Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, and
Allstate waived all claims and lienrightsfor work performed on the Property up to the time that
they endorsed and negotiated the Central Bank checks based upon the language printed on the
reverse side of the checks. To support their position, 51-SPR and Central Bank rely on
Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). In that case a contractor endorsed and negotiated a check on which was printed the
following:
In consideration of the payment of this check, the payee by endorsing, causing to be
endorsed, stamping this check with a deposit stamp, waives, releases and relinquishes all
right of lien or claims payee now has to date upon the premises described on the reverse
side hereof
The contractor in Neiderhauser argued that by endorsing and negotiating the check, he only
released claims for the services for which payment was made by that particuhtr check. See id. at
1194-95. However, the court held that "[t]he lien waivers unambiguously weave all lien rights
accrued to the date of the waiver."
In the instant case, the contractor and subcontractors argue that they only waived the right
of lien for labor or services performed to the date of their draw request. They also contend that
the waiver language at issue in this case is ambiguous and unenforceable. With respect to the
effective date in which claims are barred, this Court agrees. The waiver language at issue here
provides: "payee by negotiating this check waives, releases, and relinquishes all right of lien or
claims payee may have up to the date of the draw request described on the reverse side hereof
(the "Draw Date"), upon the property described on the reverse side hereof (the "Property").
Central Bank and 51-SPR concede that the draw date and property description was not
always described on the reverse side of the check but maintain that the contractor and
Ruling Page 4
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subcontractors should have inquired as to the meaning of the "draw date" before negotiating the
checks. This Court disagrees. The language "right of lien or claims payee may have up to the
date of the draw request" implies exactly what a reasonable contractor or subcontractor would
logically infer; the date of the draw request is the date the contractor or subcontractor requested
the draw, not the date the check was received or cashed which could be, and was at times in this
case, many months after the request.
Regardless of whether the facts in Neiderhauser are similar or distinguished from the facts
in the present case, the language at issue in Neiderhauser stated that the payee waivesrightof lien
or claims payee "now has to date" upon the premises. The language at issue in this case states
that the payee waives right of lien or claims payee may have "up to the date of the draw request".
The distinction is significant. This Courtfindsthat by endorsing the Central Bank checks,
Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate may have waived their claims and lien
rights for work performed prior to the date that their draw was requested but not for work or
services performed subsequently.
The contractors and subcontractors in this case performed certain labor or services to the
Property and then requested payment for the work performed, which represented the amount
owed as of the date the request was made. Neither the waiver language on the reverse side of the
Central Bank checks, nor the trade custom in the construction industry, support the notion that
the contractor or subcontractors, by accepting payment for work performed up to the date
requested, somehow acted as an agreement to waive all claims for unpaid labor performed
subsequent to that date.
in. TIMELINESS OF LIENS
Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(b), a notice of mechanic's lien must befiledwithin 90
daysfromthe date offinalcompletion of an original contract or the lien is invalid. 51-SPR and
Ruling Page 5

Central Bank claim that, according to Ellsworth Paulsen'sfinalALA payment application,
Building I was 100% complete by May 31, 2001. Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, and Westwood's
liens on Building I were each filed in November 2001, more than 90 days after May 31.
However, the plaintiffs argue that work was performed on Building I subsequent to May 31,
2001, and that the liens on both buildings were timely filed.
While all plaintiffs do not describe the particular building, Ellsworth Paulsen claims that it
performed work on the Property up until December 5, 2001 and its lien wasfiledon September 7,
2001. Ellsworth Paulsen also asserts that itfiledan amended lien on November 13, 2001, and
November 16, 2001. In addition, after 51- SPR claimed that Ellswoth Paulsen's liens were
defective for failing to recognize 51-SPR as the reputed owner of the Project, Ellsworth Paulsen
filed another lien on February 21, 2002. (Ellsworth Paulsen's Second Amended Complaint for
Foreclosure of Lien,filedApril 29, 2002 p. 6). Halverson claims that it performed work on
Building I up until September 20, 2001, and worked on Building II up until August 23, 2001. Its
Mechanic's Lien wasfiledNovember 26, 2001. (Affidavit of Blair Halverson,filedMay 28,
2002). Westwood claims that it worked on the Project up until November 23, 2003 andfiledits
Mechanic's Lien on November 24,2001.
Central Bank and 51-SPR concede that labor or services were perfomied on the Property
after May 31, 2001, but claim that the work performed after May 31, 2001 was trivial and not a
continuation of the original contract. However, Plaintiffs argue that 51-SPR's partner,
Broadstone, insisted that certain labor and/or services be performed on the Property after May 31,
2002 before it would pay as agreed under the contract. (Blair Halverson depo, pp. 60-64). In
Interiors contracting. Inc. v. Smith. Halander & Smith Assocs.. 827 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1992), a
tenant informed the landlord that the tenant had completed improvements as agreed under
contract. After inspection, it was determined that four minor items remained to be completed. A
Ruling Page 6
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mechanics's lien was then filed within the statutory period with respect to the four minor items
but after the statutory period with respect to the date that the tenant informed the landlord that
the work was complete.
The trial court found that the lien was not timely because "the subsequent work was
insubstantial, trivial, and could not be used to extend the statutory lien filing period." Id. at 965.
On appeal, the court disagreed and held that a contract is not "completed" with respect to the
statutory filing requirement until it has been accepted by the owner. Id. It stated that "the
homeowner cannot be heard to say that this work, done at the request of his agent in order to
complete the contract, was not a continuation of the previous work done under the same
contract." Id. at 968. The court further stated that "[w]here a property owner will not accept
lienable work as completed and refuses to pay for the same until satisfactory corrective work is
done, such property owner is estopped from asserting that the contracted work had been
completed as of an earlier date." Id.
Considering all the information, this Court finds that the work performed on the Property
after May 31, 2001 was not trivial; it involved a significant amount of labor and services and was
done at the request of the owner. The time as to work completion did not run until the job was
done as per the request of Broadstone/51 SPR. Nevertheless, with the exception of Halverson,
who specified the date of work completion with respect to each building, and Allstate, whose
timeliness was not disputed at the hearing, this Court cannot findfromthe evidence provided at
this stage of the case that the liens were timely filed. Therefore, Halverson and Allstate's
motions for summary judgment as to the timeliness of the liens are granted, but Ellsworth Paulsen
and Westwood's motions for summary judgment as to this issue are denied. A date certain shall
be set for Ellsworth Paulsen and Westwood to put on evidence regarding completion dates with
respect to Building I and Building II.
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IV. PAYMENT BOND
The Utah Code requires an owner to obtain a payment bondfromthe general contractor
guarantying that the contractor's suppliers and subcontractors will be paid before the owner
enters into a contract with the contractor if the cost exceeds $2,000.00. See Utah Code Ann. §
14-2-l(2)(a) (2001). "[A]n owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is liable to each person
who performed labor or service or supplied equipment or materials under the contract for the
reasonable value of the labor or service performed . . . " § 14-2-2. Section 14-2-2 also provides
for attorneys fees to the prevailing party in an action for failure to obtain a bond.
Under Section 14-2-1, Broadstone, as an owner, was required to obtain a payment bond
before entering into a contract with Ellsworth Paulsen that exceeded $2,000.00. Broadstone
failed to obtain the required bond and is therefore liable to Halverson, Westwood, Allstate, and
Hansen for the reasonable value of the labor or service performed by them. ^ While all parties
recognize Broadstone's liability under the statute, 51-SPR argues that it is not liable under the
statute because Ellsworth Paulsen, the general contractor, was hired by Broadstone and not 51SPR. However, in the December 30, 2002 Ruling of Judge Schofield, 51-SPR was held to be an
owner and joint venturer with Broadstone with respect to the Property, and therefore is jointly
liable for all the liabilities incurred by Broadstone in furtherance of the joint venture. This Court
concurs with that finding. Based on all of the evidence provided, this Court finds that 51-SPR is
liable under the above statute as an owner and joint venturer with Broadstone and is therefore
responsible to provide the payment bond as required by U.C. A. § 14-2-2.
Therefore, the motions for summary judgment filed by the subcontractors in this case with
respect to 51-SPR's obligation to obtain a bond are granted. Attorneys fees as allowed under
U.C.A. § 14-2-2 are also granted. As to Ellsworth Paulsen's position, however, this Court has
not received sufficient evidence tofindthat they are entitled to judgment as a, matter of law on the

Ruling Page 8
uc5

payment bond issue. A date certain shall be set for the parties to put on evidence to address this
issue.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this Court grants: (1) Ellsworth Paulsen, Halverson, Westwood,
and Allstate's motions for summary judgment with respect to the issue of lien waiver; (2)
Halverson and Allstate's motions for summary judgment as to the timeliness of the liens, and
attorneys fees granted; and (3) Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate's motions for summary
judgment regarding the issue of failure to obtain a payment bond, with attorneys fees as allowed
by statute. All other motions for summary judgment are denied. Counsel for Halverson is to
prepare an order consistent with this ruling within twenty (20) days of the date of this ruling and
submit it to the Court for signature.

DATED this V

day of April, 2003.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al.,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND ORDER

vs.
Case No. 010405059
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC,
et al.,

Judge Gary D. Stott

Defendants.
On March 6, 2003 oral arguments were presented to the court concerning various motions
and cross-motions for summary judgment submitted by 51-SPR LLC ("51-SPR"), Central Bank,
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth"), Allstate Electric, Inc. ("Allstate"),
Westwood Mill & Cabinet, Inc. ("Westwood"), and Halverson Mechanical, Inc. ("Halverson").
At the hearing, 51-SPR was represented by R. Stephen Marshall and Erik A. Olson, Central Bank
was represented by Bruce A. Maak, Ellsworth was represented by Mark L. Poulsen, Allstate was
represented by Conrad H Johansen, Westwood was represented by David R Nielson, and
Halverson was represented by Dana T. Farmer. The three issues addressed were: (1) lien waivers;
(2) timeliness of liens; and (3) failure to post a payment bond.
After considering the arguments presented by the parties at the hearing, the information
filed by the parties, and the relevant case law and statutory provisions, the Court issued its written
ruling on April 7, 2003. Counsel for Halverson was to prepare an order consistent with the
Court's ruling within 20 days from the date of the ruling. Halverson's counsel submitted its
proposed order on May 8, 2003. 51-SPR also submitted a proposed order. Objections to 51-

V - 0 wt;

SPR's proposed order were filed and/or joined by Halverson, Westwood, Allstate, and Ellsworth
51-SPR filed an objection to Halverson's proposed order After considering counsels' objections
to the proposed orders, and finding good cause for said objections, this Court issues its own
Findings and Order as follows
FINDINGS
1

51-SPR, as a joint venture with Broadstone, entered into an agreement with

Ellsworth Paulsen to construct two commercial buildings, Northshore Building I and Northshore
Building II, on real property located in American Fork City, Utah County, State of Utah and more
particularly described as (the "Property")
2

Ellsworth began work on Building I on June 23, 2000 and began work on Building

II on September 26, 2000
3

Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate entered into subcontract agreements with

Ellsworth to provide materials and labor for the construction of Building I and Building II
4

Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate entered into separate subcontracts with

Ellsworth for each building
5

In addition, Broadstone contracted directly with other contractors, including

Allstate, to provide construction materials and services for the two buildings
6.

During the entire course of bidding, contracting, and construction, the

subcontractors and Ellsworth were properly licensed contractors by the State of Utah
7.

To finance construction of Building I and Building II, Broadstone obtained a

construction loan for each building from Central Bank
8.

After work on the project commenced, Central Bank recorded its first trust deed

against the Amencan Fork Property upon which the buildings were to be built on January 3 1,
2001
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9.

During the course of construction, Ellsworth or Broadstone would submit periodic

Draw Requests to Central Bank requesting payments for Ellsworth and the subcontractors for
work performed on the buildings.
10.

The subcontractors, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate, prepared and submitted

draw requests to Ellsworth, and Ellsworth prepared comprehensive payment requests which were
submitted to Broadstone Broadstone then prepared a payment request which was submitted to
Central Bank and Central Bank prepared checks for payment to Ellsworth and the subcontractors.
11.

Each of the checks prepared by Central Bank included language regarding the

release of lien rights. The operative portion of the release stated:
In consideration of payment of this check, payee by negotiating this check waives,
releases, and relinquishes all rights of lien or claims payee may have up to the date of the
draw request described on the reverse side hereof (the "Draw Date"), upon the Property
described on the reverse side hereof (the "Property")
* **

This instrument shall not be negotiable if any of the above language has been stricken or
modified by the payee or endorser
12.

While it is disputed whether or not the "Draw Date" and the "Property"

description were identified on the reverse side of any Central Bank checks, Central Bank and 51SPR concede that this information was not described on the reverse side of all checks.
13.

Each Central Bank check identified an "Account Number" and a "Customer

Name" on the face of the Check
14.

Once the draws were approved, joint checks were issued by Central Bank and

forwarded to Broadstone and Ellsworth for disbursement to the respective subcontractors.
15.

When Ellsworth presented checks to the subcontractors they were also required to

execute an Ellsworth document entitled "Waiver of Lien" wherein it was clearly indicated which
of the two buildings the payment was intended to apply toward and the date through which the
waiver was to apply
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16.

On or about June 29, 2001, Central Bank issued checks to Ellsworth jointly

payable to several of the subcontractors, including Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate.
17.

Those checks were tendered by Ellsworth and accepted by Halverson, Westwood,

and Allstate as payments for materials and services provided to Building I.
18.

The subcontractors and Ellsworth endorsed each check and credited it as payment,

believing the checks were payment for materials and services on Building I through the following
dates: Halverson, February 23, 2001; Westwood, February 28, 2001; and Allstate, March 22,
2001.
19.

These checks were the last checks received as payment on Building I.

20.

The last draw date request that was paid to the subcontractors for materials and

services provided on Building II was for the draw requests for materials and services through the
following dates Halverson, March 23, 2001; Westwood, no payments received; and Allstate, May
31,2001.
21.

Subsequent draw requests from Ellsworth and the subcontractors for Building

I and Building II have not been paid.
22.

The following work represents the last work performed on Building I: AT&T

Sheetmetal, a subcontractor to Halverson, was working on Building I as late as September 20,
2001; Ellsworth employees and its subcontractors were performing work on Building I in
September and October 2001.
23.

The following represents the last work performed on Building II: Kimco Fire

Protection, Inc., a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install a fire sprinkler system, provided
work through September 6, 2001; Clayco, Inc., a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install
drywall, provided work on Building II through approximately September 28, 2001; Design West
Acoustics, a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install acoustical ceilings, provided work on
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Building II through October 16, 2001; and Allstate provided work on Building II through
October 16,2001.
24.

Because the Subcontractors and Ellsworth were not fully paid for the services and

materials provided to Building I and/or Building II, each recorded mechanic's liens against the
Property in the office of the Utah County recorder.
25.

Specifically, the following liens were filed against the property: Allstate Lien

#97623:2001 filed 9/26/01; Allstate Lien #113169:2001 filed 11/2/01; Halverson Lien #
122267:2001 filed 11/26/01; Halverson Lien #122268:2001 filed 11/26/01; Westwood Lein #
122532:2001 filed 11/26/01; Ellsworth Lien # 117013:2001 filed 11/13/01; and Ellsworth
Amended Lien #119260:2001 filed 11/16/01.
26.

On December 7, 2001, within 30 days after filing the lien, Halverson delivered by

certified mail a copy of the notices of lien to Broadstone as the reputed owner of the Property,
27.

Broadstone was reputed to be the owner of the Property on Halverson's

subcontracts with Ellsworth.
28.

Also on December 7, 2001, Robert Chimento, acting as the managing member of

51-SPR, sent a demand to Halverson asking that Halverson remove its liens from the Property
and acknowledging 51-SPR's possession and knowledge of Halverson's liens.
29.

A copy of Westwood's notice of lien was sent via certified mail, return receipt

requested, to 51-SPR at the address on the latest Real Property assessment roles of Utah County.
30

Westwood recorded a lis pendens against the Property with the Utah County

recorder on March 15, 2003,
31.

A copy of Allstate's notices of lien were sent via certified mail, return receipt

requested, to 51-SPR at the address on the latest Real Property assessment roles of Utah County
as the reputed owner and were received by an agent of 51-SPR on or about September 25, 2001
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and November 3, 2001 respectively.
32.

Allstate recorded a lis pendens against the property with the Utah County recorder

on April 17, 2002.
33.

Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on November 16, 2001,

to the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments via certified mail and to Robert
Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail.
34.

Ellsworth Paulsen filed a Notice of Lien on November 13, 2001 and filed an

amended Notice of Lien on November 16, 2001 with the Utah County Recorder's Office.
35.

Ellsworth filed a lis pendens with the office of the Utah County recorder on April

3, 2002.
36.

The costs of the construction, alteration, or improvement to Building I and

Building II each exceeded $2,000.00
37.

Neither 51-SPR nor Broadstone obtained a payment bond prior to contracting for

the improvements to the Property.
38.

51-SPR contracted with Broadstone for the improvement of the Property.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Lien Waivers. By endorsing the Central Bank checks, Ellsworth, Halverson,

Westwood, and Allstate waived their claims and lien rights for work performed prior to the date
that their draws were requested, but not for work performed subsequently. The date of the draw
request is the" date on which each such contractor or subcontractor requested the draw, not the
date the check was received or cashed.
2.

Timeliness of Liens. The work performed on the Property after May 31, 2001,

was not trivial It involved a significant amount of labor and services and was done at the request
of the owner The time as to work completion did not begin to run until the job was done as per
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the request of Broadstone and/or 51-SPR. Having sufficiently specified the date of work
completion with respect to each building, Halverson's lien is determined to be timely filed.
Moreover, since no dispute has been raised with respect to Allstate's lien, Allstate's lien is also
considered to be timely. Halverson's and Allstate's motions for summary judgment as to the
timeliness of their liens are granted. Attorney fees are also granted to Halverson and Allstate.
The Court reserves for future determination the issue of whether the mechanic's liens of
Westwood and Ellsworth are timely.
3.

Failure to Post a Payment Bond The motions for summary judgment of

Halverson, Allstate, and Westwood are granted The Court concurs with the December 30, 2002
Ruling of Judge Schofield where 51-SPR was held to be an owner and joint venturer with
Broadstone with respect to the Property, and therefore is jointly liable for all the liabilities
incurred by Broadstone in furtherance of the joint venture, specifically, its failure to post a
payment bond. Attorney fees are also granted as allowed by statute. As to Ellsworth's motion
for summary judgment, the Court has not received sufficient evidence to find that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the payment bond issue and therefore denies the same.

DATED this U

day of June, 2003.

BY THE COURT:

^

-

u

u
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Fourth DistricWudge

Ruling Page 7
- o j :,

A

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 010405059 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

10 day

of

NAME
DANA T FARMER
ATTORNEY DEF
4723 HARRISON BLVD #200
SUITE 200
OGDEN, UT 84403
CONRAD H JOHANSEN
ATTORNEY DEF
45 W 10000 S #300
SANDY UT 84070
BRUCE A. MAAK
ATTORNEY DEF
185 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 1300
P.O. BOX 11019
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL
ATTORNEY DEF
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 900
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
DAVID R NIELSON
ATTORNEY DEF
45 W 10000 S #300
SANDY UT 84070
MARK L POULSEN
ATTORNEY PLA
10885 SOUTH STATE STREET
SANDY UT 84070

JUkXl

20 ^ 3 *

Deputy Courtr Clerk

Page 1 ( l a s t )

^6,GJ

TabE

FILED 7hJ#3

^ ...^jntatritf Court
Fourth
, P,t"c)te of Utah
Mark L. Poulsen (5424)
Bret W. Reich (9542)
NELSON, SNUFFER,
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Fax: (801) 576-1960

O^outV

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
ORDER GRANTING
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
THE RULING ON THE
TIMELINESS OF THE
vs.
MECHANIC'S LIENS
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK,
a Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE
Civil No. 010405059
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE,
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD
Judge Stott
MILL & CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation;
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L.
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH;
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah
corporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah
corporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS
INSULATION; DECORATIVE
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation;
the DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual;
Defendants.

63

After reviewing the parties briefs regarding Ellsworth Paulsen's motion to reconsider the
ruling on timeliness of its mechanic's lien, that the mechanic's lien is timely, valid and
enforceable, the Court grants plaintiffs motion to reconsider and rules as follows:
FINDINGS
1. AT&T sheetmetal, a subcontractor to Halverson, was working on Buidling I as late
as September 20, 2001. Ellsworth employees and its subcontractors were working on Building
I in September and October 2001.
2. Kimco Fire Protection, Inc., a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install a fire
sprinkler system, provided work through September 6, 2001; Clayco, Inc., a subcontractor
hired by Ellsworth to install dry wall, provided work on Building II through approximately
September 28, 2001; Design West Acoustics, a subcontractor hired by Ellsworth to install
acoustical ceilings, provided work on Building II through October 16, 2001; and Allstate
provided work on Building II through October 16, 2001.
3. Ellsworth Paulsen filed a mechanic's lien against the property on November 13,
2001 (Lien #117013:2001) and an amended lien on November 16, 2001 (Lien #119260:2001).
4. Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on November 16, 2001 to
the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments via certified mail and to Robert
Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail.
5. Ellsworth Paulsen filed a lis pendens with the office of the Utah County recorder on
April 3, 2002.
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BASED UPON the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the work performed on the proerty
after May 31, 2001 was not trivial. It involved a significant amount of labor and services and
was done at the request of the owner. The time as to work completion did not begin to run
until the job was done as per the request of Broadstone and/or 51-SPR. Having sufficiently
specified the date of work completion with respect to each building, Ellsworth Paulsen's lien is
timely filed and the lien is otherwise valid and enforceable. Ellsworth Paulsen's motion for
summary judgment as to the timeliness of its lien is granted. Attorney fees are also granted to
Ellsworth Paulsen.

DATED this ^

day of * ~ T ^ ^

2003

Ur^/
Judge Gary D^tott w
Fourth District Judge
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Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Fax: (801) 576-1960
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION
ORDER DENYING 51-SPR'S
COMPANY,
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
Plaintiff,
THE RULING ON THE
TIMELINESS OF BUILDING I
LIENS
vs.
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK,
a Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE,
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD
MILL & CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation;
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L.
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH;
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah
corporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah
corporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS
INSULATION; DECORATIVE
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation;
the DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual;
Defendants.

Civil No. 010405059
Judge Stott

Based upon the briefing submitted by the parties, the Court hereby denies 51-SPR's motion
to reconsider the ruling on the timeliness of Building I liens.
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 51-SPR's motion to reconsider the ruling
on the timeliness of Building I liens is denied.

DATED this °\

day of

, 2003
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JudgeXjary p. Stott
Fourth Disuict Judge
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424)
Bret W. Reich (9542)
NELSON, SNUFFER,
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Fax: (801) 576-1960

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah
limited liability company, et al.
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING EPCO'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
INDEMNITIES

This matter comes on before the Court on the parties cross motions relating to theapplication,
enforceability, and validity of the indemnities contained within the Central Bank lien waivers. The
Court requested briefs on the indemnity issue. EPCO's brief was in the form of a summary
judgment. The Court also heard oral argument on December 3, 2003 from Mark Poulsen on behalf
of Ellsworth Paulsen and Erik Olsen and Steve Marshall for 51-SPR. The Court being fully advised
in the premises,
HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
Ellsworth Paulsen's motion for summary judgment to hold the indemnities inapplicable is
granted. Because 51-SPR did not pay the contract balances, 51-SPR as joint venture partner of
Broadstone has no damages arising from the indemnity. In addition, payment of contract balances
is a condition precedent to any claim of indemnity. Finally, the indemnities are invalid and
unenforceable for lack of consideration. Based on the foregoing, the indemnities are inapplicable,
invalid and unenforceable.

2

/

DATED this 3 1 day otNevkstgr, 2003

Judge Gary M Stott
Fourth District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be served, via U.S. Postage, prepaid, facsimile, or handdelivery, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON THE INDEMNITIES on the
following:

R. Stephen Marshall
DURHAM, JONES & PMEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for defendant 51-SPR, L.L.C.

Sent via:
Mail
Facsimile
Hand-delivery
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DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)415-3000
Facsimile: (801)415-3500
Attorneys for 51-SPR-LLC

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY et al.,

ORDER ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S
FAILURE TO OBTAIN A BOND CLAIM

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 010405059

BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, L.C., et al.,

Judge Stott

Defendants.

51-SPR-LLC,

Civil No. 020400442
(Consolidated)
Plaintiff,

vs.
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, L.C., et al.,
Defendants.

j

Ellsworth Paulsen's renewed motion for summary judgment against 51-SPR on
Ellsworth Paulsen's failure to obtain a bond claim, and 51-SPR's cross-motion for summary
judgment on the failure to obtain a bond claim came before the Court at oral argument on
December 3, 2003. Ellsworth Paulsen was represented by Mark L. Poulsen and 51-SPR was
represented by R. Stephen Marshall and Erik A. Olson. Based on the parties' respective
memoranda and arguments, the Court concludes that Ellsworth Paulsen, as the general contractor
in connection with the construction projects at issue, has no right of action under the payment
bond statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 to - 5 . As a result, 51-SPR is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for failing to obtain a payment bond. Based on the
foregoing, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Ellsworth Paulsen's renewed motion for summary judgment against 51-

SPR on Ellsworth Paulsen's failure to obtain a bond claim is DENIED and 51-SPR's crossmotion for summary judgment on the failure to obtain a bond claim is GRANTED;
2.

Count Nine of Ellsworth Paulsen's Third Amended Complaint for failure

to obtain a payment bond is DISMISSED with prejudice and on the merits.
DATED this

/

day oPB&kik^200¥
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BY THE COURT:
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Fourth District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /fcfi~day of December, 2003,1 caused a copy of the
foregoing ORDER ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A BOND
CLAIM to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Mark L. Poulsen

NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424)
NELSON, SNUFFER,
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Fax: (801) 576-1960

te-#i =V.^w Cfe^-t Cojrt

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 010405059
Judge Gary D. Stott

vs.

BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah
limited liability company; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a
Utah limited liability company;
Defendants.

On December 8, 9, and 10, 2003, this Court conducted a three-day bench trial.
Arguments were presented to the court concerning various motions submitted by Ellsworth
Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth Paulsen"), and 51-SPR LLC ("51-SPR"). At the
trial, the following issues were addressed: (1) the status of certain change orders; (2) abuse of
lien right under U.C.A. §38-1-25; (3) wrongful lien under U.C.A. §38-9-1; (4) contract damages;
and (5) attorney's fees.

1

Prior to the trial, both parties submitted memoranda of points and authorities in further
support of their positions. After considering the arguments presented by the parties at the
hearing, the Court requested additional briefing on issues related to Ellsworth Paulsen's
recoverability of the value of extra work and pre-judgment interest calculation. The Court has
considered all memoranda submitted by the parties, the arguments presented at trial, the relevant
case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the matter, issues the following
ruling:

BACKGROUND
51-SPR, as a joint venture with Guy Hatch and Broadstone Investments, L.C.
("Broadstone") entered into an agreement with Ellsworth Paulsen to construct two commercial
buildings, Northshore Building I and Northshore Building II, on real property located in
American Fork, Utah.
Richard Ellsworth has been the sole owner of Ellsworth Paulsen since 1984. Mr.
Ellsworth has his general contractor's license and is an engineer. Guy Hatch was the apparent
owner of the project in question. Prior to the commencement of the project in question, Mr.
Hatch and Ellsworth Paulsen had participated in the construction of a project in American Fork
that consisted of approximately six buildings. Mr. Hatch acted as the construction manager of
the American Fork project and also functioned in that capacity for the North Shore project.
Ellsworth Paulsen contends that the North Shore project was ultimately completed as required
and monies are due and owing from Broadstone and 51-SPR.
To finance construction of Building I and Building II, Broadstone obtained construction
loans for each building from Central Bank. During the course of construction, Ellsworth Paulsen
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or Broadstone would submit periodic draw requests to Central Bank requesting payments for
Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors for work performed on the buildings. The
subcontractors, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate, prepared and submitted draw requests for
Ellsworth Paulsen, and Ellsworth Paulsen prepared comprehensive payment requests which were
submitted to Broadstone. Broadstone then prepared a payment request which was submitted to
Central Bank and Central Bank prepared checks for payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and the
subcontractors. Once the draws were approved, joint checks were issued by Central Bank and
forwarded to Broadstone and Ellsworth Paulsen for disbursement to the respective
subcontractors.
Because the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen were not fully paid for the services
and materials provided to Building I and/or Building II, each recorded mechanic's liens against
the property in the office of the Utah County recorder. Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a Notice of
Lien on November 13, 2001 and filed an amended Notice of Lien on November 16, 2001 with
the Utah County Recorder's Office. Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on
November 16, 2001, to the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments, via certified
mail and to Robert Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail. Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a timely
lis pendens.
Judge Schofield previously determined that 51-SPR and Broadstone were in a jointventure and that 51-SPR was liable for the amounts owed Ellsworth Paulsen, if any, by reason of
its relationship with Broadstone. The parties are well-aware of the historical relationship
between Broadstone and 51-SPR. This Court finds it unnecessary to further recite information
with respect to that relationship and the historical information in the litigation that has brought
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the parties to the time of trial. Rather, this Court focuses specifically on its findings and
decisions as to issues that were addressed at the time of trial.
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
A,

Change Orders
1.

The balance due and owing on North Shore Building I is in the amount of

$199,830.53. The balance due and owing on North Shore Building II is in the amount of
$364,991.26. These amounts are reflected by information contained in Plaintiffs Exhibits 5 and
6, respectively.
2

As to the property referred to as the Williams property, the evidence establishes

that Guy Hatch contacted Mr. Ellsworth showing to him drawings which proposed the
development of the Williams property including Buildings I and II on the property in question.
Mr. Hatch, the primary principal and owner of the property for Buildings I and II, requested that
Mr. Ellsworth enter into an agreement with him wherein Ellsworth Paulsen paid the sum of
$110,000 to Vintage Construction for what Mr. Ellsworth assumed was to be for engineering
design work and other costs for the Williams property and possibly for Building II.
3.

Ellsworth Paulsen gave a check to Vintage Construction for $110,000 which

included $32,000 for the Broadstone project and $78,000 for the Williams North Shore project.
The evidence establishes that Mr. Hatch did not inform Mr. Ellsworth how the money was to be
used and where the funds were to go. Mr. Ellsworth assumed, based on his conversations with
Mr. Hatch, that the monies would go to those two respective projects. Mr. Hatch instructed Mr.
Ellsworth that a change order for Building II in the amount of $78,000 could be applied in that
fashion.
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As the result of a conversation with Mr Hatch, Mr Ellsworth was unsure how the

$78,000 was to be used but was informed that Hubble Engineering would be involved on the
project and Mr Hatch further represented that Ellsworth Paulsen would be repaid the $78,000
5

Mr Ellsworth paid the $78,000 as per the instruction of Mr Hatch, without

determining where the money was going and how it was going to be applied to the project Mr
Ellsworth relied upon representations of Mr Hatch, as the owner and construction manager of
the project, as to how the money would be used with assurances that Broadstone would be
responsible for the repayment to Ellsworth Paulsen
6.

During the course of the project, Mr Hatch disappeared Ellsworth Paulsen

attempted to find Mr Hatch, but for a significant period of time was unable to do so As of
November 2001, Ellsworth Paulsen became aware that 51-SPR was somehow involved in the
project, but did not know their status or relationship with Mr Hatch Mr Hatch was eventually
found by representatives of Ellsworth Paulsen to be living in Hawaii A number of change
orders had been requested by Mr Hatch for the project in question, the work had been done by
Ellsworth Paulsen, and yet the change orders had not been signed Eventually, Mr Hatch agreed
to sign all the change orders sent to him in Hawaii for that purpose
7

The evidence establishes that Mr Hatch would directly contact the subcontractors

working on the project, in most instances without first communicating with Ellsworth Paulsen,
and would make requests for changes The work and changes requested by Mr Hatch were
completed and in many cases Ellsworth Paulsen found out about the changes after the fact
8

The evidence establishes that all of the requests for change orders by Mr Natch

were performed by the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen with work being completed as
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requested and Ellsworth Paulsen ultimately being assured by Mr. Hatch on behalf of Broadstone
that the subcontractors would be paid for their work. The change orders took place in this
fashion in both Building I and II. It was not the custom or practice of Ellsworth Paulsen or Mr.
Hatch/Broadstone, to communicate with the architect for approval of the change orders. In fact,
the process for requesting change orders and having them approved involved eliminating the
architect from that procedure both by Ellsworth Paulsen and by Broadstone.
9.

As to the information reflected in Defendants' Exhibit 64 pertaining to Building I,

all of the work requested in Mr. Hatch's change orders on behalf of Broadstone was completed
by Ellsworth Paulsen.
10.

Although the evidence establishes that the parties entered into the agreement for

the development of the project to construct Building I and II using AIA document forms, this
Court finds that the custom and practice between Ellsworth Paulsen and Broadstone resulted in a
deviation from the requirement for change orders as contained in the AIA documents. As the
general custom and practice, and as a result of the relationship between Ellsworth Paulsen and
Mr. Hatch/Broadstone, all of the change orders were not written and signed off on prior to the
time work began. The change orders were done at the request of Mr. Hatch without consultation
by him with the architect, and as established in many instances, without consulting with
Ellsworth Paulsen. Instead, Mr. Hatch directly communicated and instructed the subcontractors
to make changes.
11.

By reason of the agreed upon procedure and process for processing change orders,

Broadstone waived any claim that all the change orders must be signed and the court finds that
all work requested by Mr. Hatch/Broadstone of the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen was
completed.
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12.

The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot collect from 51-SPR the $78,000 it

paid Mr. Hatch/Broadstone. Mr. Hatch's activity and participation with respect to the Williams
property did not relate to his agreements with Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR for the development of
the Auto Mall/North Shore project, nor was the Williams property part of the development of the
two North Shore buildings.
B.

Mr. Wilson
13.

The evidence establishes that Mark Wilson was the architect on the project and Mr.

Hatch asked him to design Northshore Buildings I and II. Mr. Wilson contracted with
Broadstone and Mr. Hatch for work he did on the project. The evidence does not indicate that
Mr. Wilson ever dealt with 51-SPR as to any work he performed on the project.
14.

The evidence establishes that on occasion, Mr. Hatch would meet with Mr. Wilson

and discuss the status of the project. But Mr. Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, left Mr. Wilson
out of the loop in requesting and approving change orders. Mr. Hatch himself contacted the
subcontractors directly without prior consultation with Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson was eventually
informed by Mr. Hatch of the change orders that were requested and work that was performed on
both Buildings of the Northshore project.
15.

Mr. Wilson, based upon his meetings with Mr. Hatch believed that all of the work

required by Mr. Hatch from Ellsworth Paulsen was performed according to the change order
request. On rare occasion, the evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen brought change
orders to Mr. Wilson for his approval and signature.
C.

Mr. Chimento
16.

Mr. Chimento is a real estate developer residing in California. 51-SPR is an entity

established by Mr. Chimento. Mr. Chimento and his brother met Mr. Hatch in approximately
7
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1999 and over a period of time discussed with him the development of what Mr. Chimento
referred to as the Auto Mall property in American Fork. The testimony of Mr. Chimento
establishes that as of approximately August 2001, as a result of discussions between Mr.
Chimento on behalf of 51-SPR and Mr. Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, that Mr. Hatch
voluntarily surrendered all of his interest in the project involving Buildings I and II. The
evidence establishes that at all times during the development and construction of Buildings I and
II, Mr. Hatch had the authority for an acted on behalf of Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR.
17.

The evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen had no reason to submit the

change orders for approval by 51-SPR because Ellsworth Paulsen was unaware of 51-SPR's
interest in the project.
18.

Shortly before the completion of the project, Mr. Ellsworth became aware of Mr.

Chimento and communication ensued between Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Chimento. Mr. Ellsworth
advised Mr. Chimento that Ellsworth Paulsen had not been paid for its work on the project and
Mr. Chimento assured Mr. Ellsworth that he would look into the matter and determine what
needed to be done to assure payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and complete construction on the
project.
D.

Notice of Interest
19.

The evidence establishes that the Notice of Interest, Defendants' Exhibit 22, was

prepared and filed by Ellsworth-Paulsen on or about April 2, 2001. The Notice of Interest was
filed because Broadstone was delinquent in its payments to Ellsworth Paulsen. Subsequent to
the filing of the Notice of Interest and after discussing the same with counsel, Ellsworth Paulsen
released the Notice of Interest on or about February 28, 2002 as per Plaintiff's Exhibit 26.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATED
TO THE PARTIES5 CLAIMS
I.

Breach of Contract
20.

This Court has previously determined that, as Broadstone's partner and joint-

venturer, 51-SPR is liable to Ellsworth Paulsen for Broadstone's contract debts. The evidence
establishes that 51-SPR failed and refused to pay the June, July, and August 2002 draw requests,
thereby breaching its contract with Ellsworth Paulsen. The court further finds that Ellsworth
Paulsen completed all of the required work, and there is no evidence to establish that any of the
work is defective or otherwise has problems.
21.

Therefore, this Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to the amounts set

forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 27 less the $78,000 Williams property request.
II.

Abusive Lien
22.

51-SPR has made a claim pursuant to U.C.A. §38-1-25 for abuse of lien right in

which it has characterized as a malicious lien claim. This claim pertains to activity associated
with the Williams property and the recordation of a lien by Ellsworth Paulsen in the amount of
$78,000. In determining whether 51-SPR is entitled to relief under 38-1-25, the Court adopts the
findings previously recited herein with respect to the Williams property and the $78,000 paid by
Ellsworth Paulsen to Mr. Hatch and Broadstone.
23.

Section 38-1-3 of the Utah Code provides the following:
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration or
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any
manner . .. shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively .. .

This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen believed it was entitled to lien, because the lien was
9

put in place at the instruction of Mr. Hatch in order to ensure reimbursement to Ellsworth
Paulsen for the $78,000. At the time the $78,000 was paid, and at the time the lien was filed,
Ellsworth Paulsen did not know how much of the $78,000 was used or applied to the
construction of Buildings I and II. Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith and upon the
instructions of the owner of the property when placing its lien.
24.

Section 38-1-25 of the Utah Code describes the penalties to be imposed upon

those parties who commit an abuse of lien right. This Section states:
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any
property, which contains a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or
filed:
(a) with the intent to cloud the title;
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive
claim of lien more than is due; or
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit.
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who
violates Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an original
contractor or subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the greater of:
(a) twice the amount by which the wrongful lien exceeds the amount
actually due; or
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the property.
The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen did file a lien against the property in question,
however, Ellsworth Paulsen did not intend to cloud the title to exact more than it believed was
due or procure an unjustified advantage.
25.

The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith in claiming the $78,000

based upon the instruction and direction given by Mr. Natch and Broadstone. The Court finds
that Ellsworth Paulsen's only intent in filing the lien was to ensure payment of the $78,000 it had
given to Vintage Construction at the direction of Mr. Hatch, the owner of the property. The
recording of the lien was done solely at the direction of Mr. Hatch to ensure that Ellsworth
Paulsen would be reimbursed for the $78,000 it paid. At the time the $78,000 was paid, and at
10

the time the lien was filed, Ellsworth Paulsen as a result of its conversations with Mr. Hatch, did
not know how much of the $78,000 was used or would be applied to the construction of
Buildings I and II. This Court finds that the lien was not intended to extract from the owner
more than was due or procure an unjustified advantage, because the lien was filed for the amount
to be reimbursed to Ellsworth Paulsen.
26.

Ellsworth Paulsen did not cause the lien to be filed with the intent to cloud the

property to exact more than it believed was due or procure an unjustified advantage, thus this
Court finds no violation of U.C.A §38-1-25(1). Since the Court does not find a violation of
Subsection (1), the penalties in Subsection (2) do not apply. However, Ellsworth Paulsen is not
entitled to judgment against 51-SPR for such amount.
III.

Wrongful Lien
27.

As to the wrongful lien claim, the evidence establishes that Mr. Ellsworth filed the

Notice of Interest because Mr. Hatch/Broadstone were delinquent on the payments due Ellsworth
Paulsen, and someone in his office told him it was a good idea. The Notice remained a matter of
public record from the time of filing, on April 2, 2001, until it was removed on February 28,
2002, immediately following Mr. Ellsworth's consultation with counsel. The Court finds that
the Notice of Interest was not authorized by the owner of the real property, Mr. Hatch, and was
not a proper document to have been filed by Ellsworth Paulsen.
28.

In order for 51-SPR to claim civil liability for the filing of a wrongful lien against

Ellsworth Paulsen, 51-SPR must qualify under U.C.A. §38-9-1, as either the record interest
holder or record owner of the property in question. According to U.C.A. §38-9-1(6):
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is
recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute;

(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of
the real property.
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6) (emphasis added).
29.

The Court finds that there is no evidence of a recorded interest by 51-SPR during

the time in question. Based on the evidence produced, the Court finds that there was a real estate
purchase agreement between Broadstone and 51-SPR pertaining to the property in question dated
June 15, 2000 (See Defendants' Exhibit 56), but there is no evidence of recordation of ownership
interest in 51-SPR during the time in question. The evidence only establishes an unrecorded real
estate agreement without any notice to Ellsworth Paulsen of 51-SPR's interest in the North
Shore project.
30.

The record owner at the time of recording of the wrongful lien was

Hatch/Broadstone. 51-SPR was not the record owner at the time the Notice of Interest was filed.
The Notice of Interest was filed and recorded in April 2, 2001. The release was filed on
February 28, 2002. There has been no evidence presented for the Court to find that 51-SPR was
the record owner as defined by U.C.A. §38-9-1 at the time of the recording of the document, nor
has there has been any evidence to establish that a wrongful lien had any negative impact on 51SPR's subsequent ownership of the property.
31.

Section 38-9-4 of the Utah Code sets forth the damages and civil liability for filing

a wrongful lien. The language of the statute provides that:
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs,
who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property,
knowing or having reason to know that the document:
(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
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(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim.
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3).
The Court finds that the Notice of Interest was an improper document to have been filed by
Ellsworth Paulsen.
32.

Furthermore, no request was made by Hatch or Broadstone to remove the Notice

and, under the applicable statute, Ellsworth Paulsen would be liable to the record owner at the
time of the recording of the document. 51-SPR did provide notice to Ellsworth Paulsen by a
letter from Mr. Chimento dated November 29, 2001 to remove the Notice of Interest (See
Defendants' Exhibit 51), and the claim was subsequently removed on February 23, 2002.
33.

There has been no evidence to establish that as of the date of Mr. Chimento's letter

to Ellsworth Paulsen, that 51-SPR was a "record interest holder" of the real property. The only
evidence of ownership to the real property presented at the time of trial consisted of the deed of
trust and promissory notes to Buildings I and II establishing Broadstone as the owner without
any reference to 51-SPR.
34.

The Notice was released at the direction of Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel and no

actual damages were proved. Also, no evidence of attorney's fees were proved by 51-SPR in
connection with the removal of the wrongful lien. This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is
liable to 51-SPR in the amount of $3,000. Any claim for attorney's fees under U.C.A. §38-9-4 is
denied.
IV.

Retention and Retention Interest
35.

As to the issue of retentions, the evidence produced by Ellsworth Paulsen

establishes that the claimed retentions for Building I were in the amount of $92,939.39. The
claimed retentions for Building II were in the amount of $47,142.77.
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36.

The Court finds that the custom and practice of Ellsworth Paulsen was to submit

requested draws to Central Bank or Broadstone, Central Bank was to make payments based on
these draws. The retentions represent amounts not actually paid by Central Bank. Ellsworth
Paulsen's position is that it is entitled to interest on those amounts as retained amounts by
Central Bank and/or Broadstone. The evidence establishes that such monies were never
physically accounted for and retained and identified as such by Central Bank or Broadstone. The
amounts claimed as retained monies do not exist.
37.

As to the calculation of retention interest amounts, the evidence does not support a

finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to its claim for retention interest against 51-SPR. The
monies claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen for retention were never withheld, never identified as
retained funds by Central Bank or 51-SPR.
38.

Furthermore, Ellsworth Paulsen's claim against 51-SPR for retention interest is

denied. U.C.A. §13-8-5(10)(b)(i) requires that Ellsworth Paulsen prove Broadstone and or 51SPR knowingly and wrongfully withheld a retention in order to recover. U.C.A. §13-8-5(l)(b)
states:
(b)(i) Any owner, public agency, original contractor, or subsequent who
knowingly and wrongfully withholds a retention shall be subject to a charge of
2% per month on the improperly withheld amount, in addition to any interest
otherwise due.
The Court finds that Broadstone and 51-SPR did not withhold retention proceeds, nor did
they attempt to do so knowingly or wrongfully. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen failed to
present sufficient evidence to support a finding that §13-8-5 requires 51-SPR to be responsible
for the payment of such monies.
V.

Pre-judgement Interest
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39.

With regard to Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for pre-judgment interest, the Court finds

that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recovery its claim for pre-judgment interest against 51-SPR. It is
undisputed that Ellsworth Paulsen never submitted to anyone its final payment application on
Building I or the final two applications on Building II. These three applications remain
unsigned. It is not possible for the Court to set a specific date on which payment of the three unsubmitted applications became due. The court has considered the information submitted by the
parties subsequent to the time of trial with respect to calculation of pre-judgment interest and the
court cannot, as Ellsworth Paulsen suggests, simply "pick a date" from which interest begins to
accrue.
40.

The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen has not been successful in marshaling

evidence or law to support a claim for pre-judgment interest and the court is unable to fix a date
as to the time for calculation of that interest. Based on the evidence presented at the time of trial,
it is clear that a date cannot be sufficiently calculated. Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recover its
claim for pre-judgment interest on its three un-submitted payment applications.
41.

However, the Court does find that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to pre-judgment

contractual interest on its breach of contract claim as requested, but denies Ellsworth Paulsen's
claim for interest on its mechanic's lien foreclosure claim.
VI.

Attorney's Fees
42.

Attorney's fees are generally awarded to the prevailing party. U.C.A §38-1-18(1)

explains that a Court is allowed to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party:
(1) Except as provided in Section 18-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which
shall be taxed as costs in the action.
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1) (emphasis added).
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43.

By reason of the claims made by 51-SPR, this Court must make a determination as

to which of the parties is the prevailing party entitled to make a claim for attorney's fees. Under
Pochvnok v. Smedsrud, et. aL 2003 UT App 375, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that the
trial court was in a better position to determine which party was the prevailing party.
Considering all of the factors and formulas discussed in Pochvnok, the Court finds from all the
evidence presented, that Ellsworth Paulsen is the prevailing party in the case and is entitled to
attorney's fees and costs. The factors the Court relies on to support its findings that Ellsworth
Paulsen is the prevailing party are as follows:
A.

Ellsworth Paulsen's breach of contract claim is granted.

B.

The work was performed by Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors on
North Shore Buildings I and II at the direction of the owner, Mr. Hatch
and Broadstone, both under the terms of the contract and through change
orders, with full compliance by Ellsworth Paulsen in performing all of the
work requested by the owner.

C.

Judge Schofield previously found that 51-SPR, by reason of a joint
venture with Broadstone and Mr. Hatch, stood in the same position as
Broadstone.

D.

The Court has reviewed all of the evidence produced with respect to the
amounts claimed regarding the mechanic's lien claim and has evaluated
those amounts at issue and determined that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to
its claim on the mechanic's lien claim for amounts less the $78,000
associated with the Williams property.

44.

Considering the totality of all the evidence, even though a portion of the claimed

amount was denied to Ellsworth Paulsen, the facts support a finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is the

prevailing party. Furthermore, in this case, the facts distinguish the application of the Pochvnok
case; in Pochvnok, there was an offer of judgment submitted which the Court of Appeals relied
upon to reach its determination as to which party ultimately prevailed in the lawsuit. Here, there
was never an offer of judgment by 51-SPR or Broadstone.
VI. Reasonableness of Attorney Fees
45.

After the Court determined that Ellsworth Paulsen was the prevailing party, and as

such was entitled reasonable to attorneys fees, Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel submitted an
affidavit setting forth what it suggests are the reasonable attorney fees in this case. As required
by the case of A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518
(Utah App. 1999), Ellsworth Paulsen has allocated in its affidavit those attorney fees which are
recoverable under the lien statute, from those fees which were incurred pursuing legal claims and
theories for which it would not be entitled to a fee award. As set forth in the affidavit of counsel,
Ellsworth Paulsen, is claiming that it is entitled to $164,993.60 for fees which are related directly
or indirectly to its mechanic's lien claim. The Court has reviewed the affidavit using the factors
set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Broken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). These factors are: 1)
Was the legal work actually performed ? 2) How much of the work was reasonably necessary to
prosecute and defend the matter? 3) Was the attorney's billing rate reasonable in light of the
locality and type of services rendered? 4) Are there other factors requiring special
consideration?
46.

As to the first factor, the court finds that the attorney fees presented by Ellsworth

Paulsen represent fees for work actually performed. The fees requested are not disproportionate
to the amounts claimed or recovered. This is particularly so considering the amounts which were
originally claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen, before several of the subcontractors were eliminated
from the case through settlement. The court has reviewed the entries for the work claimed, and
17

recognizes that most of such work related to work being presented in one form or another in
open court. In this case, many of the issues presented in the form of motions and trial work
evidence were inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claims. This includes the entries for such
issues as the lien waivers, the timeliness of the liens, the writ of attachment, the legal work
related to the alternate security, and like matters. The court finds also that the amounts claimed
by Ellsworth Paulsen as allocated to the claims for which it can recover is reasonable in the
amount of $164,993.60, and that the work reflected for those fees was actually performed.
47.

As to the second issue of what legal work was reasonablely necessary to prosecute

the case, the evidence supports the reasonableness of the fees as to this factor. This action was
complex from the beginning, with at least twelve different parties involved. The record shows
that there were approximately 21 depositions taken, and approximately 90 motions filed. 51SPR asserted numerous counter-claims, which could have defeated recovery under the lien, but
which were defeated by Ellsworth Paulsen, primarily through motions. 51-SPR has filed an
affidavit in support of its default judgment against Broadstone and Hatch claiming fees in this
case, and a much smaller related case, of $427,249. As such, the evidence supports Ellsworth
Paulsen's contention that $164,993.60 is an appropriate and reasonable fee under the
circumstances.
48.

The Court also finds that the hourly rates charged by Mr. Poulsen and Mr. Reich,

the attorney fees for Ellsworth Paulsen, are billing rates which are customarily charged by
attorney's of their experience. Mr. Poulsen's rate through all but the last two months of this case
was $170 per hour, and Mr. Reich's rate was $140 per hour. These rates are customary and usual
for this type of legal work in Utah and Salt Lake Counties.
49.

Finally, as to any special factors which support the award of fees in this case, the

court reiterates those points referred to above when it found that Ellsworth Paulsen was the
18

;j

prevailing party in this case. Those factors included the fact that 51-SPR breached the contract
by failing to pay contract balances, and that all of the work, including the extra work, was
properly and timely performed and contained no defects. Accordingly, as Broadstone's joint
venture partner, the work should have been paid for by 51-SPR.
VIL COSTS.
50.

Ellsworth Paulsen has submitted a verified memorandum of costs in which it seeks

reimbursement for its costs in the amount of $7,467.73. The claimed costs consist of expenses
for filing the action, services of process, witness fees, deposition transcripts, and certain limited
duplication and blow-up charges for trial exhibits. The court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is only
entitled to get the costs of depositions on those persons who actually testified at trial. Ellsworth
Paulsen has claimed costs for two deponants who did not testify at trial. Those persons were
Kyle Spencer whose deposition costs were $162, and Angela Solberg who deposition costs were
$477.60 These sums are reduced out of Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for costs, leaving net costs
allowed to Ellsworth Paulsen for costs of $6,828.13.
ORDER
Based upon the forgoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to a judgment in this matter on its breach of contract

claims and mechanic's lien claims in the principle amount of $199,830.53 on Northshore
Building I.

Ellsworth Paulsen is also awarded judgment for $364,991.26 on Northshore

Building II, minus $78,000 for the change order representing amounts paid for work on the
Williams property, and $3,000 for filing the Notice of Interest. This leaves a net judgment of
$483,821.79 ($364,991.26 + $199,830.53 = $564,821.79 minus $78,000 and minus $3,000 = Net
Judgment $483,821.79).
19

2.

Ellsworth Paulsen is further entitled to contractual interest of $57,863.94 in

accordance with the attached Schedule "A. This interest rate should be augmented by the
interest which has accrued since December 22, 2003, (the day that Schedule "A" was prepared)
through the date of this order, which sum is $7,768.47, for a total pre-judgment amount of
$65,632.41.
3.

Ellsworth Paulsen is also entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party in this

case. The reasonable attorneys fees awarded to Ellsworth Paulsen is $164,933.60 through
February 17th, 2004, to be taxed as costs as required by Utah Code. Ann. §38-18-1(1).
4.

Finally, Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to $6,828.13 to be taxed as costs.

In summary, Ellsworth Paulsen is awarded a judgment in the total amount, including
principle, interest, attorney fees and costs of $721,215.93 Based upon the 10% per annum
interest rate set forth in the parties' contract, this judgment shall continue to bear interest postjudgment at 10% per annum, and any judgment rendered herein may be augmented by Ellsworth
Paulsen's reasonable attorney fees through collection. The total judgment rendered in this case
may be enforced against the Alternate Security Bond on file with the Court in which Capitol
Indemnity Corporation is the surety.
Dated this

/ / d a y of ^ ^ 3 0 0 4 .

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

R. Stephen Marshall
Erik Olsen
20

SUMMARY OF INTEREST DUE ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS
Pay Request #
Building 1
Date
3/6/2001
7
7
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
7
7
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
7
7
3/6/2001
7
3/6/2001
7
3/6/2001
7
3/6/2001
7
3/6/2001
7
3/6/2001
3/6/2001
7
4/16/2001
8
none
9

Due Date
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
4/5/2001
5/16/2001
none

Date Paid
4/16/2001
5/7/2001
6/27/2001
7/5/2001
7/18/2001
7/26/2001
7/31/2001
8/10/2001
12/31/2002
10/14/2003
12/10/2003
not paid
not paid
not paid

Invoice Amount
47,429.87
$
27,938.67
$
8,000.00
$
26,974.91
$
10,343.70
$
34,260.58
$
3,961.18
$
11,139.70
$
800.80
$
2,089.02
$
16,133.59
$
36,457.43
$
87,138.17
$
76,234.93
$

Building II
12/15/2000
2
3
1/11/2001
5/31/2001
7
7
5/31/2001
8
7/17/2001
7/17/2001
8
7/17/2001
8
8
7/17/2001
8
7/17/2001
9
none
none
10

1/14/2001
2/10/2001
6/30/2001
6/30/2001
8/16/2001
8/16/2001
8/16/2001
8/16/2001
8/16/2001
none
none

2/2/2001
2/21/2001
7/31/2001
10/15/2003
12/31/2002
10/15/2003
10/15/2003
12/10/2003
not paid
not paid
not paid

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

345,284.19
260,050.42
7,342.50
1,710.86
10,601.00
119,425.00
32,978.00
59,559.41
83,146.18
197,079.64
78,465.15

Days Late
11
32
83
91
104
112
117
127
635
922
979
991
950
0

19
11
31
837
502
790
790
846
858
0
0

Interest Rate
Interest Due
10.0%
142.94
$
10.0%
244.94
$
10.0%
181.92
$
10.0%
672.53
$
10.0%
294.72
$
10.0%
1,051.28
$
10.0%
126.97
$
10.0%
387.60
$
10.0%
$
10.0%
$
10.0%
$
10.0%
9,898.44
$
10.0%
22,679.80
$
10.0%
$
TOTAL
35,681.15
$

10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10 0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
TOTAL

GRAND TOTAL FOR BOTH BUILDINGS

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

1,797.37
783.71
62.36
19,539.35
22,182.79

$

57,863.94

Hansen settlement
Westwood settlement
Halverson settlement

never submitted

Allstate settlement
Hansen settlement
Allstate settlement
Westwood settlement
Halverson settlement
never submitted
never submitted
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Mark L. Poulsen (5424)
NELSON. SNUFFER,
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Fax:(801)576-1960

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY dba
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,

JUDGMENT
Civil No. 010405059
Judge Gary D. Stott

Plaintiff,

BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a
Utah limited liability company; 51-SPRL.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
Defendants.

On February 3, 2004, the Court made a ruling in which it determined that Plaintiff
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Services ("Ellsworth Paulsen") had prevailed in the action with
Defendant 51 -SPR, LLC. Subsequently, on the lb

day of _

tyUdq

, 2004,

the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which it found for Ellsworth
Paulsen, granting an award of principal, interest and attorney fees.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Ellsworth Paulsen be awarded Judgment against said
Defendant 51-SPR, LLC in the amount of:
$483,821.79
$ 164,933.60
$ 65,632.41
$ 6.828.13
$721,215.93

Principal.
Attorney fees through February 8th, 2004.
Accrued interest through February 3, 2004.
Accrued costs through February 3, 2004.
TOTAL JUDGMENT

This judgment shall bear interest on the total Judgment at Ten Percent (10%) per annum
in accordance with the contract between the parties through the date of payment, plus
after-accruing costs.
This judgment is enforceable against Capitol Indemnity Corporation, the Surety which
provided an alternate security bond, the original of which is lodged with the Court, securing the
amounts for which judgment herein is given.
Dated this jfo

of

^Mf}(i

, 2004.
V

BY THE COURT:
M

^T,
/

Gary D. Scott d i s t r i c t Court Judge

>•„

^S^VQ^MAZ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be served, via U.S. Postage, prepaid, facsimile, or handdelivery, a true and correct copy of the foregoing. JUDGEMENT on the following:
R. Stephen Marshall
Erik Olsen
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for defendant 51-SPR, L.L.C.
DATED this

//

Sent via:
>C Mail
Facsimile
_ j r _ Hand-delivery

day of May, 2004

O ^ U
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THIS ADDENDUM # 2 TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT BETWEEN
BROAOSTONE INVESTMENTS, LLC AND 51 SOUTH PORTLAND REALTY CORP. DATED
JUNE IS, 2000
RE;

Auto Mall Development

The terms and conditions of this Addendum #2 are hereby incorporated in the above
Real Estate Purchase Contract as If set forth at length therein.
This memorandum shall summahre the terms of th* agreements reached regarding the
above development project and set forth the same in contractual form, Intending to bind the
parties with regard thereto, as dosing of title on the real estate te needed by 6/15/00;
thereafter more detailed agreements In appropriate form wiM b« prepared and executed
reflecting the following terms:
a New York
- Utah tide company as nominee for 51 South Portland Realty,
, a Utah LLC CUtah LLC) (Guy Hatch and
, his
corporation (Chimento), and
partner will own this, see below as to restrictions;) will acquire tWe as ten?nts«ln*common (with
a 50% interest k) each) to the entire 6,58 acre parcel from Ford investment Enterprises
Corpc ation for the purchase prtrr of $1,750,000.00 (the *und"),

- Chimento will contribute as capital to the projact the sum of $2,900,000.00 to be
transferred to and held by Utah Title Company as a Qualified Intermediary (*QO and applied
as follows:
$1,750,000
5,000(7)
87,000
545,000
•MMXHK?)

Total

•
•

to purchase
To costs of purchase
Commission to ReMax
To site Improvement costs
To building construction costs (see following)

i %900,000

- Utah LLC shaJ be the project manager In charge of obtaining remaining needed
construction financing and Institutional permanentfinancingfor Buildings I and 11 (hereinafter
"office buildings"), construction supervision, leasing of the buildings, sate of the station/store
site, and operation of the venture. Utah LLC wttt recent a fee of $135,000.00 for such services,
payable In three installments of $45,000.00 on Jury 15, 2000, September 1, 2000 and October
15, 2000.
- Utah LLC wHI provide financing for needed construction monies for the office building
end remaining cash needs of the project. Guy Hatch will guaranty such financing.
- Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy «n common interest to secure
institutional constructionfinancingbut wiH not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee
at any time
• Chimento funds for site development and construction costs "hard" costs only not
"soft" costs except the Utah LLC fees or interest) will be utilized prior to any other construction
<%\

e\*r cocuMBWJWMfu >r KB»V«»»M<M»C

IIP
51-SPR 00190

-Ge/Itf/OO

FKI 1 7 : 2 3 FAX 201 343 0967

0»/l$/00

FRI 1 S : * 2 FAX 201 343 OflBT

P & H, L L P
f ft K.

01007
p.3
12)003

LLP

financing, on a standard draw schedule with 10% retainage (Inclusive), to be released by QI
after Inspection approval by a Chimento engineer to be retained by CWmento and paid as a
project cost
• Utah LLC shett be a single member, single purpose LLC satisfactory to NJ counsel for
CWmento whose ownership interest and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure Utah
LLC's and Hatch's obligations, with a restriction agreement In recordable form satisfactory to M
counsel In favor of Chimento es to the UC and the LLC's tenancy m common Interest in the
land.
- Utah LLC shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest in the land to Chimento to
secure the pledge and restriction agreements 4$ well Hatch's obligations pursuant to this
memo, Chimento shall subordinate Its mortgage only with respect to Institutional construction
financing, chimento win release this mortgage will be released upon completion of the project
and closing of permanent Institutional financing.
Note: Chlmento's acquisition of its interest In the project is through a "Uke-KfexT exchange and
where the term Chimento Is usedr QI shall act as Chlmento's nominee until Chimento may take
title pursuant to IRS regulations,
The parties intend that following completton of the project and at the time of permanent
financing but not earlier than 1/1/2001, as they miy hereafter agree, Chimento and Utah LLC
may transfer their Interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equally by them, otherwise
consistent with the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shaH be held for
investment and all actions by the parties shall be In furtherance of that goal. (New Utah UC
documents to be satisfactory to M counsel for Chimento).
• The development project shall be on a cash basis with a calendar year end.
- Chimento shall receive a 10% return on Ks capita! commencing December 1, 2000
through the end of thefirstyear following dosing on the land, to be paid monthly commencing
on 1/1/2001. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be paid from operating income of the project
if sufficient, end if not, then frgm proceeds of s&e of a portion of the land - the
station/convenience matt, If any, Utah LLC shall contribute any and all sums to the project
needed for payment of such return.
- Any net operating income remaining m the first year, to Hatch.
• Chimento shaH have tr>e option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second year
on terms set forth above for year l, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project for
the year following dosing on the Land.
- Thereafter Chimento and Utah, LLC shall share 50/50 in net operating income of the
project.
- Permanentfinancingw ••< "take out" allfinancedconstruction costs (including soft costs
and leasing costs) (No brokerage »s to be paid to Hatch or affiliated entities) and the project or
buildings individual w* secure the same if financed as to the whole or individually. The parties
agree to consult as to the amount of permanentfinancingwhich may exceed the above and, if
C:v%TV DOCW$HT*wr3 »Vf U W Hl**\MfHO &PC
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agreed, such excess to be applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse in the fbllowlng order
as available, (I) land dosing costs; (ii) allocated construction costs, i,e, building l and bgilding
2; (iii) allocated site improvement costs, i.e., building J and building 2; and (iv) allocated land
costs, I.e. building 1 and 2; and after Chimento capital repaid In full, to each 50/50.
• Subsequent capital transactions (refinances, sales, casualty or condemnation) after
debt repayment to (0 remaining unpaid Chimento capital; and thereafter (ii) to each 50/50.
Distributions of net operating Income after completion of construction, to be made not less than
quarterly.
Distribution from capital transactions no later than 20 days after receipt.
All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made #fter consultation.
Monthly construction and leasing reports to be submitted by Hatch*
Quarterly statements to be submitted within 30 days of close of quarter.
Year end statements to be submitted within 45 days of dose of year.
Tax ret.ns to be prepared, and delivered to tenants-in-common within 75 days of close of
yt^ai.

Such returns shall reflect th«it the property is held as tenants-ln<ommon interests and not as a
partnership, All such elections sh$» be mad* to be consistent with this.
Hatch's development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter Into a consulting agreement with
CNmentos, individually, with regard to property development Indusive of the project, to a term
running through March I, 2001, for a fee of $24,000,00 per month payable montHy
commencing July 1, 2000 (except the Xily 1, 200Q payment shall be $12,00000).
The provisions of this Addendum shaH survive closing of title*
SI SOUTH PORTLAND RfALTY CORP.

BROAOSTONE INVESTMENTS, LLC

V/
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In consideration of payment of this check payee bv negotiating this check waives
releases, and relinquishes ail right of lien or claims payee may ha\e up to the date
of the draw request described <m the reverse side hereof (the "Draw Date") upon the
property described on the rexcrse side hereof (the "Property**) The payee certifies
that this check is payment for labor and materials dial were actually performed upon
and furnished to the Property Payee warrants and guarantees under penalty of fraud
dial payment in full has been made by payee to the suppliers of all labor and
materials to the Property incurred up to die Draw Date at the insistence of payee
Payee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless die owner of die Property and Central
Bank or its assigns, from any loss, claims, or expenses incurred by diem by reason
of or rising out of any liens or claims made against die Property by any supplier of
labor of material at the insistence of payee This instrument shall not be
negotiable If any of the above language has been stricken or modified by the
payee or endorsee
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